Political Anthropology
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POLITICAL ANTHROPOLOGY

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This review discusses materials on political anthropology and related topics published in the period 1959–68.* An introductory section reports and discusses several programmatic statements on political anthropology as a subdiscipline. The main body of the review reports a few publications of the last ten years, selected to illustrate three dimensions of the discipline of political anthropology: type of political system, phase of the political process, and relevant environmental system. A concluding section relates the concerns of current political anthropology to classical formulations and suggests some topics that may be of interest in the future. In order to sketch a comprehensive picture of political anthropology, and for reasons of space, I have felt obliged to concentrate on writings with a comparative or theoretical aim. This is not intended to disparage more descriptive studies; however, it is not really feasible to summarize them here.

Appended to the review is a bibliography accompanied by four indexes. The first index groups all entries in the bibliography by geographical area; the other indexes list entries on the topics illustrated by each section of the text. These indexes, constructed in a few months by one person who is not a professional anthropologist, are entirely preliminary, and are intended only to suggest some of the principal concerns of political anthropology and facilitate access to the relevant literature. The reader is warned that many publications of the first importance are not referred to in the text, and must be

gotten at through the indexes. I would like to thank both the editor and the readers of the *Review* for tolerating this innovation in format. I regret that many significant publications could not be listed in the already oversized bibliography, and hope to remedy this deficiency in a later publication.

INTRODUCTION

In a notable contribution to this *Review*, David Easton remarked, "Although the title of this essay is 'political anthropology,' such a subfield does not yet exist and will not exist until a great many conceptual problems are solved" (Easton 1959: 210). As Easton's own work suggests, these problems are primarily those of political science as a whole, and only secondarily those of respecifying concepts for application to particular primitive, historical, and contemporary populations. Since Easton is the political scientist most often referred to in anthropological writings on politics, it may be useful to outline his analytical image of the political system.

Easton has defined a political system as "those interactions through which values are authoritatively allocated for a society" (Easton 1965: 21). The political system exists in an environment composed of other social and nonsocial systems, which may be divided into systems in the same society as the political system in question and systems outside that society. Political science, and by implication political anthropology, derive their intellectual coherence from the effort to formulate the systematic characteristics of political systems as such, the politically relevant characteristics of their environments, and the nature of the linkages between the two. The political process involves the translation of politically relevant characteristics of the environment into inputs of support and demand to the political system, the conversion of these inputs into outcomes through consensus and conflict at the core of the political system, and the output of values and costs to the environment.

Several anthropologists have disagreed with the restriction of the term "politics" to activities oriented toward "authorities" at the top of a "society." A counterproposal is that of Swartz, Turner, and Tuden, for whom the study of politics is "the study of the *processes* involved in determining and implementing public goals and in the dif-

ferential achievement and use of power by the members of the group concerned with these goals" (Swartz, *et al.* 1966). In this view, politics is a process of competition to influence outcomes. It does not necessarily involve superordinate authorities, and it may cut across the frontiers of societies or occur in groups much smaller than whole societies. The major requirement is that the outcomes be "public," in the sense of affecting the group as a whole and requiring the consent of the group as a whole. Rather than starting from structure and expecting activities to converge on structure, we should start from the definition of a particular kind of process and track down the activities that make up this process, regardless of any structural boundaries they may cross. By assuming that political systems always coincide with governments and societies, Easton precludes the exploration of the differences between political systems that do and do not so coincide. If we start from the concept of a "political field," defined as just about everything and everybody involved in a political process, this bias can be avoided.

In his introduction to a recent volume on local-level politics, Marc Swartz has gone a step further, arguing that even the notion of "field" is not inclusive enough, since it omits the "arena" of those indirectly involved with those who take part in a political process. He then addresses himself to the delicate problem of how to draw a line between the two concepts of field and arena as they expand and contract in relation to each other. As Swartz observes, his suggestions are "not a theory, but only a way of calling attention to problems and data which might otherwise be overlooked" (Swartz 1968a: 8). This is a significant point, given the verve with which these recommendations have been put forward in the introductions to two useful volumes. The conceptual reduction of activity to abstract categories is not scientifically useful unless the categories identify elements of empirically real systems of cause and effect. If the three levels of aspiration of political anthropology are description, analysis, and explanation, then one might say that analysis is even less likely than description to be scientifically fruitful unless it is guided by explanatory hypotheses. There is little hint in the theoretical vocabulary proposed by Swartz and his colleagues of how to specify under what circumstances alternative behaviors occur.

M. G. Smith has questioned whether "Bushmen, Pygmies, or Eski-

mos have governments which are functionally homologous with those of the United States and the Soviet Union" (M. G. Smith 1966: 7). To impute the same functions to all political systems is "virtually to abandon the central problem of comparative politics." Having demonstrated to his satisfaction that approaches based on process, content, and function cannot be used to compare political systems, Smith presents a structural approach of his own. The social units on which he focuses are the corporate groups that comprise the enduring "public" of a political system. The task of comparative politics is to analyze the structural principles on which these corporate groups are organized and articulated with each other in different political systems, and to determine "what differences or uniformities of political process, content, and function correspond with observable differences or uniformities of corporate composition and articulation" (p. 126). In particular, Smith is concerned to analyze the different types and degrees of autonomy that these corporate groups display in relation to each other and in relation to the central government, insofar as there is one.

A number of typologies have been proposed for primitive political systems, each implying a distinctive program of analysis. Easton proposes a typology based on the extent of structural differentiation between political and other social roles, on the extent of differentiation among political roles, and on the degree of specialization of particular political roles. Since these three types of differentiation are interdependent, Easton suggests that they will tend to vary together along one continuum. Different positions on this continuum are likely to be associated with differences in, for example, criteria of recruitment, claims to the legitimate use of force, continuity of political processes, and rate of segmentation of support structures (Easton 1959).

S. N. Eisenstadt (1959) has proposed a classification of primitive political systems based on the extent of structural differentiation of the political system and phrased in terms of the types of social units from which the political system is constructed—age grades, autonomous villages, secret societies, etc. He also suggests that political systems develop in response to problems arising out of differentiation in other parts of the society (p. 214). He recommends that political systems be characterized according to the particular Parsonian function that they emphasize: executive activities, administration of technical

functions, special articulation of party-political activities, or ritual affirmation of values. This pattern of emphasis should in turn be related to the pattern of emphasis among these functions in the social system at large. Putting all this together, Eisenstadt hypothesizes that a given aspect of political activity will be embodied in a special organization according to: "(a) the main goals and value orientations of a society; (b) the types of resources needed for their maximization; and (c) the extent to which these resources are not available through the internal work of various subgroups of the society" (Eisenstadt 1959: 217).

Almond and Powell (1967) have constructed a more elaborate typology of political systems, and have applied it to the analysis of a number of primitive and historical systems. Their book may be recommended to anyone wanting a lucid summary of the creative ferment in comparative politics during the early 1960's. Almond and Powell accept structural differentiation as an important typological dimension, but add an analogous dimension, cultural secularization, which they define as the development of specialized concepts and attitudes related to politics. In addition, they discriminate the degree of autonomy that the political system displays toward the social system in which it exists. Finally, in stressing the importance of evaluating the performance capabilities of political systems, they imply a further discrimination according to type and level of functional adequacy achieved.

It is not hard to see why anthropologists should eschew a definition of politics phrased in terms of the society as a unit. Often, they study populations whose social boundaries are difficult to define, or parts of larger societies for which the society-wide political system defines neither the issues nor the operational units of politics. This difficulty was emphasized by Fortes and Evans-Pritchard (1941) in their introduction to *African Political Systems*. They gave as an example the fact that Tallensi lineages overlap like a series of intersecting circles, so that it is impossible to state clearly where the lines of political cleavage run. The difficulty has been given even sharper point by Stevenson (1968), who argues that Fortes, assuming all of the Tallensi to be "a society," did not give appropriate attention to interregional political and economic relations (Stevenson 1968).

It is also not hard to see why anthropologists resist a definition of

politics that requires an irreducible minimum of centralized authority. Although Easton has partly gotten away from conceptions of politics limited by recent Western experience, his notion of "authoritative allocation" in the "most inclusive social system" does closely resemble the notion of state sovereignty. Yet sovereignty is precisely what is lacking in the uncentralized and local-level political situations studied by anthropologists. Mair (1962) has spoken of the "diffuse authority" characteristic of East African political systems; and Leach (1960b) has argued that the overlapping of areas of authority in Southeast Asia makes the sovereign state a poor analogue for tribal political systems there. Bohannan (1963) has suggested that a distinction between unicentric and multicentric power systems may handle part of this problem.

In short, a number of anthropologists have defended the view advanced by Fortes and Evans-Pritchard: that there is a radical distinction between political systems in which power has been centralized in an institutional structure for control of which actors are competing and political systems in which no such preponderance of power has ever been achieved. As Sahlins (1968) has phrased it, at the uncentralized end of the tribal spectrum "the degree of integration decreases as the level of organization increases, and degrees of sociability diminish as fields of social relations broaden." At the centralized end, essentially the reverse is true. Anthropologists are concerned with both ends of this spectrum. As Morton Fried (1967: 228) has commented: "Appreciation of the efforts of modern political scientists to cast broader nets and catch important political processes outside the formal institutions of modern government must not lessen our dismay at the implicit emasculation of the concept of force and power as the fountainhead of those institutions designated 'the state.'"

POLITICAL SYSTEMS

The headings under which we shall group political systems are basically those proposed by Service to describe the "levels of sociocultural integration" of whole societies: primates, bands, tribes, chiefdoms, primitive states, empires, and developing states. These headings are employed simply as an indexing convenience, and as a means

of making rough distinctions at a descriptive level. It should be noted that Service has recently disowned his categories as evolutionary stages. He points out that the bands and tribes observed after contact by Westerners are probably smaller and larger, respectively, than the political units into which aboriginal peoples were organized; and that many primitive states are the result of contact with technologically more advanced peoples. However, he still regards these categories as useful in classifying the literature on observed societies. (Service, in Fried *et al.* 1968.)

There is some danger in classifying the concerns of political anthropology in this way—political phenomena do not come bundled in such neat packages. A single political system may exist in complex relationship with other systems of lower, equal, and higher orders. These may be external relations, in which lower forms are disrupted or displaced by higher forms, or internal relations in which lower forms are nested within higher ones. All of these possibilities are part of the record, and providing an account of what happens in each case is part of political anthropology. For some purposes, the operational unit for research is not an individual political system, but a population of systems distributed in a particular way in relation to each other in space or time, or in relation to their environments. The concerns of political anthropology range from social units as small as a single individual acting in a political situation up to the worldwide distribution of human political characteristics at particular points in time; and from illuminating the interior environment of a split-second decision to examining ranges of variation that are detectable only across the entire span of human history. Obviously, different people using different theoretical equipment must pursue each of these concerns. However, political anthropology as a whole is not limited to any one of them, and requires, if it is to come into focus before us, that we change theoretical lenses as the angle or range of our perspective demands.

Primates. Man is the political animal, and presumably in the long run political anthropology hopes to establish some general framework for comparing man with other animals from a political point of view. One could, for example, analyze animal populations as systems for processing information about the environment and about interactions

within the adaptive unit, or as systems for allocating incentives for behavior. A political system could then be defined as a subcase of such a system, shading off into other subcases along definable dimensions. Whether animal populations "have" political systems would not be the question. Rather, one would ask: What sort of coordinative behavior do animals display? To what degree, along particular dimensions, do their systems of organization approximate political systems? By treating such organization as an adaptive characteristic of each species or group, one could provide an evolutionary context in which to place politics as an adaptive characteristic of man as a species. One would be in a position to ask in what respects politics had "emerged" at various stages in man's development, how his other adaptive characteristics are related to politics, and for what aspects of what environments what sorts of politics are adaptive in what way.

Some suggestions along these lines have been made by writers on political anthropology (see, for example, Sahlins 1959, and Fried 1967: 38–49). As for the literature on primates, it may be said that the major conclusion reached so far is that field studies are possible, and richly complement experimental ones. Work published so far stresses that primate social organization differs significantly from species to species and within the same species according to environmental conditions (P. Jay 1968). Together with the exciting possibilities that have been opened up in the tracing of human evolution, the general effect of primate studies is to widen one's appreciation of the adaptability and variability of primates in general, and to alert one to the specificity and not so infinitely variable adaptation of man in particular. Summarizing recent work on man's social development, Ralph Holloway, Jr., has put forth the following hypothesis (in Fried *et al.* 1968):

Human evolution has been the evolution of a paradox. The evolution of the brain, social structure, and symbol systems has also meant an increase in frustration and aggression. The meaning of symbols in the adaptive evolutionary sense is at least two-fold: they aid in cognitive optimization, and also, they mediate the social controls necessary to stem what arises out of the human condition, frustration and aggression. The same symbolically defined groups outside of biological relationships (clan, tribe, state, nation, ideology), bring in their wake its antithesis: extra-group aggressional ten-

dencies. Role differentiation and intra-group commitments generate frustration and power allocation. . . . The structures, social and symbolic, which permit [man's] adaptations, also insure frustration, pain and conflict.

Even in such general conclusions there are implications for political anthropology. For example, insofar as primates cooperate as spontaneously as some of them appear to, and insofar as human evolution has selected for cooperativeness within the adaptive unit, perhaps human political systems do not carry quite the internal load of ordering and coordinating the naturally unruly that one might assume. One is tempted, in projecting backward onto simpler societies the models that have been constructed to study the politics of complex societies, to project also the need for authoritative coordination and for explaining how social order is maintained in the absence of bureaucracy. To the extent that orderliness is an evolutionary heritage, and to the extent that internal disorder and external hostility are, say, density-dependent phenomena, we may be trying to explain how the simplest societies solve a problem that largely does not exist for them. Similarly, Arthur Stinchcombe has criticized Max Weber's assumption that one could only have rational organization of production if one had bureaucracy. In fact, organizing tasks by leaving their coordination to those with relevant skills is sometimes a rational adaptation. In environments characterized by short-run or seasonal variability in the volume, type, and location of tasks, it is not economical to maintain a centralized communication network. Perhaps such models will help to explain variability among primate social systems. In any case, the basic lesson for political anthropology in evolutionary theory is not that culture evolved, but that organizations of behavior should be studied in relation to the environments to which they are more or less successful adaptations (Stinchcombe 1959, Alland 1967).

Bands. Perhaps the basic question raised for political anthropology by the literature on bands is the extent of variation among bands—and more particularly, the extent of variation in their political systems. The generic descriptions by Service and others suggest that bands show no stratification of class, status, or power, and little institutionalization of formal leadership roles (Service 1966). At the same time, it is clear from monographs, particularly those on the Australian

aborigines, that a lively politics with significantly differential out-
comes for the participants occurred. Hart and Pilling (1960) have
described the trading in claims to women that makes up a political
career among the Tiwi. The reward of a successful career is not ac-
cession to political office, but the organization of wives of various
ages into an efficient team for collecting food, providing a higher stan-
dard of living for the political entrepreneur and attracting younger
or less successful men to his camp. The maturation of such a politi-
cal career over the life cycle of individuals is an important determi-
nant of the distribution of people and resources at particular points
in time, and conveys a sense of organized political process that a focus
on episodes of "conflict resolution" would not. This process is not,
however, focused on formal political structures, though one gains the
impression that on issues threatening their privileges politically suc-
cessful older men support each other in enforcing the status quo.
Meggitt (1962) and Hiatt (1965) have concluded that for the Wal-
biri and Gidjingali the local band, which is not recruited from a single
patriline, is the largest group with political and administrative func-
tions; and that the tribe has no formal apparatus of government, no
enduring hierarchy of authority, and no recognized political leaders.

   A fascinating symposium of recent work on hunter-gatherers has
been edited by Lee and DeVore (1968). Their introduction sum-
marizes some politically relevant ideas about these populations. Ow-
ing to demographic fluctuations within local groups and unpredict-
able variations in food supply, population must be continually redis-
tributed among local groups. This is facilitated by the absence of
immovable personal or collective property, the granting of reciprocal
access to food resources, and the exchange of women at marriage.
People and resources are not allocated by inflexible jural rules of
residence, marriage, or descent, but by adaptive and opportunistic
affiliation across an essentially bilateral kinship grid. Serious conflicts
within a band are likely to be resolved by fission rather than by vio-
lence, which contributes to the circulation of population and the limi-
tation of group size. Conflicts between individuals from different
bands, however, may lead to violent confrontations between them
and their respective allies, and sometimes to intermittent raiding be-
tween groups.

Tribes. Sahlins (1961: 325) has argued that the basic building block of the tribe is the "primary tribal segment," which he defines as "the smallest multifamily group that collectively exploits an area of tribal resources and forms a residential entity all or most of the year." Primary segments ally up to whatever structural level external pressures require, and fall to quarreling among themselves down to whatever level external pressures permit. Scheffler has argued, *contra* Gluckman, that the forces maintaining such systems reside not in the definition or dynamics of the conflict itself, but in the ecological and economic conditions responsible for fragmentation in the first place (Scheffler 1964c). The distinction between "bands" and "tribes" appears to be that where there are bands, conditions require not only small size but also spatial separation, and consequently a low rate of interaction among primary segments. Where there are tribes, productivity is higher, segments are closer, interaction is much more frequent, shared interests are stronger, and the unit of political integration is potentially much larger. Accordingly, the loci of politics in tribal societies are in the relations among the members of the basic resource-owning and resource-using primary segments, in the relations among these corporate groups, and in the relations among individuals who are members of different primary segments. Tribal political systems are chiefly distinguished by the relative extent to which choice opens up and political activity intensifies within these three kinds of relationships.

Classically, anthropologists have analyzed politics in tribal societies in terms of the cultural principles by which the primary segments are conceived and related to each other in the minds of the members of the society. Sahlins (1963a) has suggested that descent principles are more likely to be important in individual relations within primary segments when those principles are important in relations between groups. On the other hand, there is no necessity for this, and no necessity for the important descent principles to be the same at the two levels. Reservations about the functional significance of classifying societies in terms of cultural principles have been voiced by a number of anthropologists. Befu and Plotnicov (1966) have suggested that when describing a descent group as corporate, anthropologists should specify corporate in regard to what functions. They

suggest that in unilineal descent groups the smallest segments will tend to emphasize economic activities, the median segments political activities, and the largest segments religious activities. Obviously, this affects both the levels in the system at which particular kinds of problems will arise, and the levels at which they will be resolved.

I. M. Lewis (1965) has also stressed the necessity for adding functional specifications to any cultural description, comparing a number of societies with unilineal descent to show that its functional significance varies both according to the purposes to which it is applied and according to the alternative cultural principles that are operative. The simple fact that characteristically within a single society several alternative cultural principles are employed for the same purpose by itself raises the complexity of comparative analysis based on cultural principles by several orders of magnitude. For political anthropology, this complexity is perhaps at its peak in tribal societies, where a wide variety of principles is employed for a wide variety of purposes, and where political functions are only sometimes and only ambiguously singled out by principles of their own. Our attention is therefore particularly directed toward studies that have tried to reduce this complexity by identifying politically significant clusterings of behavior.

Beginning with societies in which principles of patrilineal descent play a role, we find that anthropologists have begun to compare earlier studies in Africa with more recent studies in Oceania. In an incisive overview, Barnes (1962) has suggested, as a general contrast, that organizational emphasis in Africa falls on intergroup relations and is phrased in terms of descent, whereas organizational emphasis in Highland New Guinea falls on interpersonal relations, including relations with those in other groups, and is phrased in terms of kinship. Recruitment to groups in New Guinea is usually by cumulative patrifiliation—in other words, sons consistently choose to remain in their father's group. In the classically described African societies, a newly born child is automatically placed in a group on the grounds of descent, at least in principle. The lines of political cleavage in classically segmentary African societies are, in principle, preordained by the segmentation of lines of descent. Since descent lines control and transmit rights to substantial economic resources, they are likely to

determine the lines of political cleavage in practice. Descent lines are not so defined, and significant resources not so transmitted, in most Highland New Guinea societies; and the lines of political cleavage are defined by a distribution of interests and alliances achieved by the initiative of individuals. These differences may be influenced by the difficulty of monopolizing the type of natural resources available in New Guinea (Barnes 1962). Meggitt (1965) has argued that descent is important in at least one New Guinea tribe, pointing out that among the Mae Enga claims to land based on agnatic ties become more important as pressure on land rises. Barnes has rejoined by arguing that what Meggitt has demonstrated for the Mae Enga is really only patrifiliation after all (Barnes 1967).

Turning to societies in which matrilineal descent plays a role, we find a continuing interest in the politics of the "matrilineal problem" of combining matrilineal descent and virilocal residence. Van Velsen (1964) has provided an account of ordered anarchy among the Tonga. In the absence of clear principles and the presence of conflicting ones, people are caught up in networks of cross-cutting obligations that effectively constrain them. The situation is similar to that among the Ndembu of Central Africa, as described by Victor Turner (1967), except that the Tonga, instead of dramatizing their areas of agreement to themselves in the form of ritual, air their disagreements in the form of constant quarrels. Turner's book, regarded by David Easton as not basically concerned with politics, continues to grow in stature as lucid accounts of Ndembu ritual flow from Turner's pen (Turner 1968a), and to exert a growing influence as others recommend his method of the "social drama" in a "social field" as a format for political anthropology (Swartz 1968a: Introduction).

A. L. Epstein (1968) has recently compared an African and an Oceanic society, the Ndembu and the Melanesian Tolai, both employing matrilineal descent. His approach is similar to that of Barnes (1962), but more radical in agreeing with Easton that a purely structural approach encourages the identification of only one kind of critical variable, namely, the type of segment competing for power. Epstein also contrasts the goals, resources, leadership, and support in the two societies. The Tolai hamlet is not a ritual, jural, or political unit, as is the Ndembu village. Tolai "big men" are not the holders

of an "office," as are Ndembu headmen; the power of the Tolai big
man stems basically from his command over resources, whereas the
power of the Ndembu headman stems basically from his authority
over people. Finally, the Tolai are not likely to employ witchcraft to
curb the ambitious, as is common in Central Africa, since personal
aggrandizement is central to the whole Tolai ethos.

Analyzing the political significance of double unilineal descent,
Rosemary Harris (1962b) has suggested that a number of societies
in which dispersed matrilineal clans are responsible for avenging
homicides are less prone to feuding between coresident groups than
other societies in which blood compensation groups and residential
groups coincide. Taking this lack of coincidence as a criterion, she
notes that some double-descent systems have more in common with
certain matrilineal and non-unilineal systems than they have in com-
mon with other double-descent systems. However, these systems
heighten conflict within the coresident group, and the area of damp-
ened conflict extends outward only as far as external kinship ties
reach. Among the Mbembe, intervillage matrilineal ties are fostered
by a cult of the earth and the collective dead. Among the Yakö, on
the other hand, weak villages have merged with strong ones, creat-
ing large, endogamous settlements that are strengthened internally
by cross-cutting ties but are relatively hostile to outsiders.

David Schneider (1962) has analyzed the unifying role that dis-
persed matrilineal clans play in the system of double descent on Yap.
Patrilineages and the villages they form hold, respectively, land as
food and land as rank; political activity consists of unstable alliances
among villages in which each village tries to raise its rank while pre-
venting the others from doing the same. The complementary tie of
matrilineal descent expresses not differences in rank, but rather un-
differentiated solidarity. Schneider argues that because of its affective
strength, matriliny is able to provide an integrative mechanism that
contractually phrased reciprocity cannot. He observes that although
double unilineal descent might seem unusual in employing alternative
principles of organization in the same system, probably most systems
incorporate such alternatives.

What is significant for political anthropology is the extent to which
any particular cultural principle places constraints on choice or opens
up new areas of choice that allow some latitude for political manipu-

lation. Leach (1962) has argued that if one defines descent as automatic recruitment to a group by virtue of birth alone, then, at least in regard to the property transmitted from generation to generation within that group, it is satisfactory to treat unilineal descent systems as structures placing severe constraints on choice. He proposes, however, that "in all viable systems there must be an area where the individual is free to make choices so as to manipulate the system to his own advantage" (p. 133). These areas of social structure require strategic rather than structural models, and they are presumably the areas of critical concern to political anthropology. Scheffler (1965) sees even less of a role for kinship principles in placing restrictions on choice, arguing that the vocabulary of patrilineal and cognatic kinship on Choiseul Island is simply a way of phrasing the restrictive and inclusive aspects of political alliances, not a jural system with a moral force in its own right. Claims to rights can be expressed in the language of kinship, but can only be settled by transactions among political actors, transactions which in a society without enforceable law come down to mutual bargaining and coercion. The expansion and contraction of partially overlapping political factions is accordingly a major aspect of Choiseulese society. Peter Lawrence (1965–66) has described a somewhat similar system of overlapping "security circles" of bilateral kindred, affines, and persons in various special relationships for the Garia of New Guinea.

David Schneider and Jan Pouwer have both called for approaches to structural analysis that will break down sweeping typologies into smaller components, which can be reassembled into different configurations as the problems under investigation and the facts of the case require. This would leave us not only with structural principles whose functional significance must be weighed for each case, but also with fragments of principles that could only be assembled into structural principles in the light of some common function or functions. This suggests the need for at least two analytical moves on the part of political anthropology. First, there may be higher-order concepts that can regroup the more descriptive structural categories according to the similarity of their practical consequences in particular societies. These concepts would be of the order of abstraction of the amount of information about alternative courses of action coded into a category, the probability that actors in the society would behave in accordance

with any practical or preferential ranking of alternatives implied by
a category, and the proportion of significant decisions in the society
that are in fact bound up in these categories. Second, there may be
functional categories related to politics that can group observed be-
haviors into classes with explanatory significance more efficiently
than can be done by an infinitely permutable concatenation of struc-
tural terms. If political anthropology cannot supply some of these, it
will have been a disappointment.

Chiefdoms. Service (1962) and Sahlins (1968) characterize the
chiefdom as a political unit constructed from ranked descent units,
in which a hierarchy of authorities coordinates economic, social, and
religious activities. A chiefdom differs from a tribe in having cen-
tralized authority and a degree of functional interdependence among
its parts; it differs from a state in that the chief has only a majority,
and not a monopoly, of legitimate coercion, so that there are not po-
litical classes of rulers and ruled.

Gluckman (1965), in a general review of politics in tribal societies,
has noted some of the gradations between purely ad hoc personal
leadership on the one hand and an institutionalized and powerful
office of leadership on the other. These range from the diffuse au-
thority accorded elders, through the position of personal influence a
man may build up through hard work and good luck, to the possi-
bility that a personal social position becomes of such crucial signifi-
cance in the organization of the group as a whole that rather than
being dismantled after the death of the holder, it is inherited or other-
wise reassigned in toto to someone else. Gluckman is not very system-
atic in analyzing the social conditions under which these alternatives
are likely to occur. However, he suggests, rather as Leach did for
highland Burma, that political systems in tribal societies are inher-
ently unstable, oscillating back and forth between relatively concen-
trated and relatively dispersed distributions of power. Consequently,
"The difference between tribes organized under chiefs and those
which lack chiefs is not as great as it appears to be" (Gluckman 1965:
85). Insofar as local groups are not systematically ranked, and insofar
as leadership within local groups is not allocated by some automatic
criterion, the strength of local leadership is in part related to the stage
and success of the careers of those competing for local leadership. Or,
as in highland Burma, there may be some longer structural cycle at

work, in which strains accumulate in some part of the system until its limits of tolerance are reached and there is a structural change, probably a reversion to some previous form. Sahlins (1968) has also spoken of cycles of centralization and decentralization, with the concentration of resources eventually being short-circuited by an overload on the relation of leaders to people. "Different structures have different coefficients of economic productivity and political power, as well as different limits" (Sahlins 1968:93). Powell (1960) has provided a particularly clear analysis of oscillation around such limitations in the Trobriand system. He concludes that although the organization of villages under the political leadership of big men cooperating in clusters is a basically stable arrangement, the natural relationship among the clusters is one of competition.

In an exemplary monograph, Rosemary Harris (1962a) has analyzed and compared the political organizations of three tribes of the Mbembe of Nigeria. All the Mbembe tribes have dispersed matriclans and coresident patriclans whose relations are mediated with greater or lesser authority by a village chief or priest, called the *Avat* or *Ovat*. The *Avat* is the role in which village, lineages, associations, and the supernatural come together. The first of the three tribes analyzed, the Osopong, are interesting because, under the pressure of land grabs by neighboring Ibo, their patriclans also have dispersed among the villages. The organization of conflict within the village has shifted from the patrilineages to a cross-cutting system of dual age-grades and twin wards, weakening the solidarity of the villages and the position of the *Ovat*, heightening intervillage ties and cooperation, and transposing the unity of the tribe to the rather limited ritual authority of a particularly prestigious *Ovat*. The second tribe, the Okum, are interesting because at the time of Harris's study the pressure of events was pushing one of their *Avat* into becoming a "divine king." The Okum illustrate a suggestion of Evans-Pritchard (1962): where there are strongly organized corporate groups whose relationships are not firmly structured, politics may take a ritual form to symbolize intergroup relationships. Among the Okum, these groups are the villages; and the major rituals, unfortunately for the incumbent, are first the installation and later the burial of the tribal *Avat*. The *Avat* does little to symbolize tribal unity between these events, encouraging short tenures and a high turnover in the office. The third tribe, the Adun,

illustrate a complementary suggestion of Evans-Pritchard; where crucial political functions have been transferred to the tribal level, a symbolic politics of this kind will give way in part to centralized administration. The basic rules of social structure are essentially the same in all three Mbembe tribes. The differences in their political systems are explained by the fact that the unit on which pressure from the environment falls is the patrilineage among the Osopong, the village among the Okum, and the tribe among the Adun. Harris accordingly makes the important observation that if any one of these tribes had been studied in isolation, a convincing argument might have been advanced that the nature of the political system, and in particular the position of the *Avat*, followed necessarily from the tribe's system of double unilineal descent and village associations—an argument that would have been in basic respects wrong.

Fredrik Barth (1959a) has described the equilibrium achieved in Swat Pathan political organization between two dispersed but politically corporate blocs of allies. Each bloc results in a complex way from the choices of individuals manipulating a variety of structural principles based on birth, residence, and dyadic contract. Each bloc contains the political followings of two kinds of leaders. Chiefs, who are members of the landowning patrilineages, build up followings among peasants, craftsmen, and lesser landlords through their control of land, wealth, and respect. They compete with each other in something resembling an acephalous segmentary system. Saints, through their control of land, their role as mediators, and their reputation for morality and holiness, build up more dispersed followings of religious pupils, which cross-cut the followings of the chiefs. The divisive competition among chiefs for territorial dominance is offset by the integrating role of the saints, who arrange compromises and reduce tensions. Systematic conflicts of interest in the dominant patrilineages lead to fission of these groups, and to their alignment over the whole of Swat into two continuously opposed political blocs.

Sahlins's 1958 monograph on social stratification in Polynesia has stirred a series of criticisms and comparisons. Sahlins argued that, other things being equal, greater productivity led to greater stratification. Ramage organization tends to develop where complementary resources are widely scattered, whereas descent-line organization tends to develop where complementary resources are concentrated.

Social organization permitting multiple affiliations develops under conditions of low productivity (Sahlins 1958: 248–53). Possibly the most radical critique of these arguments is that of Orans (1968), who argues that what Sahlins is really measuring when he discusses productivity is not the efficiency of the economy or its capacity to produce a surplus, but simply the total amount of food each island produces, which is naturally greater for the larger and richer islands. More food allows a larger population, which is the immediate cause of steeper social stratification, since more administrative levels with more power may be needed to manage a larger population, and since differences in prestige and privilege are easier to establish and maintain in larger than face-to-face groups. Also, population and stratification may be correlated through a third variable, such as conquest or heterogeneity. One is reminded here of the elegant model constructed by Robin Marris to predict managerial decisions in large corporations. Marris (1964) argues that top managers try to maximize the size, not the profits, of their organizations, since they can only raise their own salaries by broadening the base of the organizational pyramid on which they are standing. A broader base means a taller pyramid and, through a series of intervening variables relating status and income, higher salaries for those at the top. In other words, it is not necessary to assume that the taller social pyramid is really performing a social function if cultural factors can be shown to be holding span of control constant.

Primitive states. There are approximately as many definitions of the state as there are writers on political anthropology (Adams 1966, Fried 1967, Krader 1968, and Vansina 1962b). At least two areas of fact seem to be at issue. On the one hand, there are the nature of the organizational structure and the kind of power by which compliance is obtained. On the other hand, there are the scope and pervasiveness of the behaviors for which norms are being set and the definition of the population who must comply. A "strict" definition of the state would describe it as an administrative staff that has a monopoly of force and is responsible for maintaining order among all the people in a given territory. When one is dealing with the total range of political systems that have existed in human history, some issues are bound to arise. How minimal can this administrative staff be? How much is a monopoly, and to what extent can economic and normative power

substitute for force? Does the order that is maintained involve only preferential access to and employment of coercion, or does it extend to preferential access to wealth and prestige? Do the goals of the state go beyond maintaining order to supervising economic production or inculcating and practicing an ideology? Finally, are there ways of defining jurisdiction other than territoriality? What is at stake is not so much what defines the state as what difference the prevailing characteristics make for purposes of analysis and explanation. Anthropologists are trying to explain the probable previous and future course of development of such political systems, the consequences of different organizational characteristics for their internal functioning, and the external adjustment of political systems to their environments.

There has been considerable interest in the process of state formation, particularly with regard to the ancient Middle East, the Americas, and Africa. Dramatic contributions have been made by field archaeologists and historians, as well as by those one would ordinarily think of as political anthropologists. The temporal depth and causal controls which these contributions bring to classic questions of political anthropology simply revolutionize one's image of the discipline. It is obviously impossible to review here even such important syntheses as the new *Cambridge Ancient History*, the *Handbook of Middle American Indians*, or the contents of the *Journal of African History*. Nevertheless, these and the vast literature they represent have contributed most of the important advances in knowledge about state formation, partly of course under the inspiration of collaborating political anthropologists and the points of view they represent. Among writings by anthropologists, Robert Adams's important comparative analysis of state formation in Mesopotamia and Mexico (Adams 1966) has been discussed in detail in the 1967 edition of this *Review*, and its conclusions will be mentioned only briefly here. Adams stresses the overall similarity of development in the two cases —from theocratic polities to militaristic polities to conquest states with an extended organization of trade and tribute. He summarizes the differences between the two cases as follows (p. 174):

The foregoing analysis suggests that among the crucially distinctive features of early Mesopotamian civilization were its relatively more compact area and settlement pattern and correspondingly more unified culture; its

prevailing ability to dissolve the ethnic identifications of immigrants and to foster urban loyalties instead; the striking continuity of occupation and tradition in all its major cultural centers; its precocious innovativeness in the crafts and hence its rapidly, cumulatively advancing technology; and its emphasis on the development of administrative and redistributive institutions concerned with economic management. In central Mexico, on the other hand, smaller, more widely dispersed valley enclaves were the characteristic units of settlement; the basic continuities were found more often in self-conscious, periodically mobile ethnic groups than in urban centers; technology remained essentially static over long periods; and there was more emphasis on market integration than on vertically organized redistributive networks.

In a more typological vein, Morton Fried's essay (1967) on the evolution of political society outlines the structural changes that might have been necessary in societies before states could arise independently within them. He constructs ideal types of egalitarian, ranked, and stratified societies, suggesting that stratified societies were highly likely to give rise to pristine states. (See also H. Lewis 1966.)

Among writers on the structure and functioning of primitive states, Peter Lloyd (1965) has constructed a model of African kingdoms based on three modes of recruitment to the active political elite and stressing other variables related to the policy-making process. Recruitment may be through selection as representative of a descent group, through gradual advancement within a political association or organization, or through selection from a closed ruling group defined by ethnic differences, ranking of descent groups, or hereditary aristocracy. Lloyd's other variables relate to the distribution of power in the society: the political power of the royal lineage, the definition of rights to land, the control of physical force, and the preservation of individual rights. He specifies three factors of change: demography, conquest and trade, and the decline of descent groups. Finally, he briefly describes three configurations of these variables and the variations in political process and political change he would expect in each. Here, then, is an orderly exploration of dimensions of variation. Nevertheless, after sixty concisely argued pages, one still feels the need for a more complete specification of many of the variables, and a more explicit account of the presumed causal relationships among them, which may be some measure of the sheer number of pages that more

complete accounts are likely to require. Lloyd himself regards the
paper more as a plea for similar efforts than as a final analysis. Even
so, this is an important paper, and Lloyd is able to make some inter-
esting observations on the basis of it. He notes that the three types of
political systems he constructs resemble those suggested for Polynesia
by Irving Goldman. Goldman had argued that the system with strong-
ly developed lineage organization was likely to be the more "primi-
tive," whereas that with greater structural differentiation was likely to
be the more "advanced." Lloyd, however, sees no evidence for such
a progression in Africa, and in fact suggests that in many cases the
political cycle may have run in the opposite direction. (See also
Goody 1966.)

M. G. Smith (1960) has contributed a study of government in the
Hausa chiefdom of Zaria in northern Nigeria from 1800 to 1950. The
study is a tour de force of ethnology, method, and theory. Its ethno-
logical focus is on the changes brought about in indigenous govern-
ment by the Fulani conquest and by later British rule. Its methodolog-
ical focus—how to use historical materials in anthropological analysis
—puts African political anthropology squarely in the middle of the
revolution in African historiography that has occurred in the last dec-
ade. Its theoretical focus, complex but clear, is on the process of struc-
tural change. Smith's method of analysis is to ignore the specific
process of change, and to try to define the structural conditions of
successive stages of change by comparing them over time (pp. 330–
31). He argues that it is essential to work from an abstract theory of
change involving "the logical organization of the system of formal
categories in a necessary and irreversible order" (p. 331). Smith's
own theory follows from his distinctive and precise definitions of
politics and administration. On the basis of his analysis of the Hausa,
Smith suggests three general laws of structural change: the law of
differential resistance, the law of self-contradiction in change, and the
law of structural drift. These are stated as follows:

Law: Resistance to changes in the form of a system varies directly with
their significance for the persistence of the system in its current form.
Corollary: Changes initiated on the basis of authority and focused on its
reallocation evoke less resistance than changes initiated on the basis of
power and focused on its redistribution.
Law: Resistance to changes in the content of a system varies according

to their significance for the maintenance of the current structure. *Corollary:* Attempts to change the form of a system by changing its content are self-defeating.

Law: Given stability in its context, the structure of a governmental system changes as a function of the political system it generates internally. *Corollary:* The rate and type of change in a governmental system corresponds to the type and intensity of the pressure which its operation focuses on the revision of the formal categories on which its structure is based.

These propositions reflect an important aspect of the transition from non-state to state-centered political systems: the decreasing prominence of the natural external environment as a determinant of political behavior, and the increasing importance of the political system itself as a mediator of values and costs. (For related discussions, see Ember 1963, Lenski 1966, and Udy 1965.)

Empires. The term "empire" will be used here to refer broadly to the literate, large, and frequently multi-ethnic states that from time to time have ruled the populations of traditional agrarian societies. Previously, anthropologists concentrated on the rural populations of these societies. However, with the rise of interest in urban anthropology and in the overall integration of "complex societies," the division of labor among anthropologists, historical sociologists, and historians has become rather unclear. Unfortunately, it has not been possible to review detailed studies of particular traditional agrarian societies written by historians, studies which will presumably be of increasing interest to political anthropologists in the future. Rather, we shall contrast three important overviews of this enormous tract of history.

The first of these is a pioneering work in comparative historical sociology, S. N. Eisenstadt's *Political Systems of Empire* (1963). Eisenstadt is concerned with what he calls historical bureaucratic societies, which he sees as standing halfway between patrimonial-feudal political systems and modern bureaucratic political systems. The important questions to him are what enables historical bureaucratic societies to emerge in the first place, and what determines whether they then perpetuate themselves, slip back into prebureaucratic forms, or progress on to modern ones. Eisenstadt argues that two independent variables determine whether a historical bureaucratic political system will emerge: limited but pervasive structural differentiation in the society, freeing resources from automatic allocation by

ascriptive criteria; and the development of autonomous political goals by the rulers. Differentiation facilitates political development by making resources potentially available, and also creates regulatory problems for which bureaucratic supervision is appropriate. Autonomous political goals require differentiated political structures; but the basically traditional values of the society and the partial embeddedness of the political system in traditional social units limit autonomy and give the political systems of the historical bureaucratic societies their distinctively mixed character. Eisenstadt considers that this account is basically confirmed by a table in which he scores historical societies on the relevant variables. In most cases societies with a greater differentiation of structure and more autonomous political goals also have a greater differentiation of structure and process in their political systems.

Eisenstadt then turns to two further questions. First, to what extent can variations among historical bureaucratic systems be explained by variations in the independent variables of social differentiation and autonomous political goals? Further, assuming that the basic requirement for the perpetuation of these political systems is a continuation of the conditions that produced them, to what extent does the presence of a partly autonomous political system alter these conditions? To answer these questions, Eisenstadt plunges into a comparative analysis of the role of the rulers, bureaucracies, and major social groups in these political systems, and the social and cultural determinants of variation in these roles. Unfortunately, the answers that emerge are not nearly so precise as the questions that have been posed. The general impression given is that in less differentiated, more traditional societies there are fewer conflicts of interest and ideology between rulers and ruled, and fewer resources and channels for political activity. In more differentiated and less tradition-bound societies both rulers and ruled have more resources at their disposal, and both are more willing to use them. Competition between rulers and ruled for the limited resources in a less advanced society was likely to lead to a withdrawal of support from the bureaucratic polity and a regression to a patrimonial or feudal system. Competition in a more advanced society was likely to concern how more abundant resources should be used, and could lead to the development of a more modern political system.

Our second overview, William McNeill's *A World History* (1967), establishes a certain grandeur of scale on which at least some of the basic questions of political anthropology must be answered. NcNeill sees the historical bureaucratic societies in terms of the interaction among major civilizations, with the locus of initiative and preponderance of power shifting among them from time to time. Historical timing and geographical location become centrally important. Innovations in military technology and organization, and the problems of organizing military forces to control domestic populations and cope with external enemies—factors not stressed by Eisenstadt—assume a critical causal role. For example, bronze-age empires in Greece, India, China, and the Middle East had power concentrated in the hands of a decentralized warrior elite, owing to a decisively superior but expensive military technology. The wide distribution of cheaper iron weapons brought about more egalitarian political systems, accompanied by extreme political instability. The development of cavalry warfare and improvements in transport and communication allowed the full development of the techniques of empire, based on an alliance of legally supported interregional traders and professional standing armies that had complete military superiority within their own imperial boundaries. McNeill (p. 58) remarks:

In the larger frame of world history the development of such a fundamental instrument of power as a standing army, supplemented by a semiprofessional militia for campaigns, certainly marks a major landmark in political evolution. Both Roman and modern European armies based themselves on the administrative principles first worked out by the ancient Assyrians and Persians.

These imperial regimes could exist, however, only so long as they could defend themselves against raids by pastoral light cavalrymen. The most efficient solution to this problem was the organization of a heavy cavalry carried on stronger horses fed with agricultural alfalfa. This solution was distasteful to centralized bureaucracies because, like the expensive military technology of the bronze age, it required either the central concentration of enormous wealth or the creation of a class of landed aristocrats. Therefore, heavy cavalry was adopted only where nomad pressure was strongest, in Central Asia and Iran. Behind the shield so provided, trade flourished, and Middle Eastern and Indian civilization reached new heights. However, as barbarian

pressure rose, China, Rome, Byzantium, and eventually Europe were forced to choose between a relatively ineffective centralized bureaucratic system and the more efficient but decentralized Sassanian "feudal" system. China under the Ch'in and Han built a wall to buffer out the external environment; under the Sui and T'ang it built the Grand Canal to facilitate the internal concentration of resources. The Romans declined to decentralize and declined altogether. The Byzantines accepted decentralization only gradually and reluctantly. The Europeans adopted a decentralized military technology based on forts and on a heavy cavalry mounted on big horses and equipped with armor, stirrups, and a heavy lance. This successful adaptation, supported by aggressive merchants, and the spread of heavy plow agriculture, enabled Western knights to take the initiative against Magyars, Vikings, and Arabs by 1000 A.D.

Finally, in his concise essay *Peasants,* Eric Wolf examines traditional agrarian societies from a more anthropological perspective. He defines a peasantry as a class of food cultivators who are integrated into a society having a state which forces them to pay rent to powerholders above their social stratum. In a suggestive analysis of coalition formation among peasants Wolf delineates the characteristic organization of power relations between these strata in various parts of the world. He observes that what he calls "polyadic vertical many-stranded coalitions"—in other words, coalitions like descent groups, involving many persons or groups, involving peasants with superior outsiders, and involving many types of mutual interests—occur in India, the Middle East, and China. They do not occur in manorial Europe, post-conquest Middle America and the Andean area, the Mediterranean, and neotechnic Europe. The Middle East occupies an intermediate position, since dyadic single-stranded coalitions are more characteristic there, offset by both dyadic and polyadic many-stranded coalitions. Wolf notes (p. 91):

This distinction appears to divide societies based on centralized and despotic power, exercised largely through the delegation of prebendal domains, from those in which power is more decentralized. The decentralized systems, however, show two subpatterns. The first, characteristic of the Mediterranean, is built up largely in dyadic terms through patron-client relations. The second, found in medieval Europe and in Middle America and the Andes after the Spanish Conquest, usually subordinated a corpo-

rate peasant community to a dominant domain owner in the vicinity. This figure then operated as a patron toward the community as a whole.

A second major distinction divides all the systems from neotechnic Europe, which in its emphasis on occasional forms has been able to construct vertical relationships on a single-stranded rather than a many-stranded basis.

This distribution of agrarian political forms follows approximately from the historical patterns outlined by McNeill (1967). Among the areas with centralized systems, China, India, and the Ottoman Middle East were classical loci of centralized bureaucratic empire. Among the areas with decentralized systems, the Mediterranean has been politically fragmented since the fall of the Roman Empire, and manorial Europe and Spanish America were major patrimonial systems. Western Europe was separated from all other systems in late traditional times by yet another revolution in economic and military technology.

All of which suggests that the operational units for explaining political configurations in empires lie to a considerable extent at the level emphasized by McNeill, in the military interactions and adaptive responses of the major civilizations. To say that a society is more or less differentiated explains nothing in itself. It merely litters the historical landscape with skeletons of greater and lesser complexity, while making no serious attempt to describe either the societies that inhabited them or the environments to which they were adapted. To explain the rise and fall of empires by focusing attention on the autonomy of rulers' goals without providing an explanation for the autonomy of their power is probably misleading.

Developing states. The reader will no doubt be relieved to hear that we are not going to attempt a survey of recent anthropological writings on the politics of the developing areas. Rather, we shall limit ourselves to delineating some of the characteristic concerns of political anthropologists in these societies, taking a monograph by F. G. Bailey (1960) as an example.

Bailey's first book was a study of the decline of caste as a political institution within a single Indian village. In his second book, *Tribe, Caste, and Nation,* he treats the village not as an isolated unit, but "merely as a convenient field of observation, where several political systems can be seen at work and impinging upon one another. . . . I

have shown that tribe, caste, and nation are three different political alignments; three forms of allocating scarce resources, and of uniting to compete for those resources; three different kinds of arenas, in which are engaged three different kinds of groups" (Bailey 1960: 269). Bailey points out that in trying to analyze the relations among these three systems, he is not concerned with Nadel's problem of how different structures concerning ritual, kinship, and politics are integrated into one grand system (Nadel 1957). Rather, he is trying to find out how the political actor allocates his actions among three systems with essentially the same purpose. An approach to political change that merely hypothesizes a past structure and a future structure "does not do justice to the complexity of the present or the subtlety with which choice can be made between different systems" (p. 251).

Bailey's monograph illustrates an approach to complex societies that goes not only beyond the village study but also beyond the approach that asks primarily how a village is "articulated" with the national society. By focusing part of his analysis on political competition within the regionally dominant caste, Bailey approaches the full-scale examination of regional social systems. The best example of this type of analysis, though not a specifically political one, is the stunning series of articles by G. William Skinner on rural Chinese social structures (G. W. Skinner 1964–65). By paying careful attention to the spatial structure of social interaction, and by capitalizing systematically on the concept of central places as "systems within systems of systems," Skinner has revealed the possibilities for systematic analysis of at least one complex society. In the Indian case, relatively primitive regions may be composed of nothing larger than villages, whereas the more advanced ones may contain kingdoms and chiefdoms. Bailey suggests (p. 264) that the best way to deal with the complex mixture of tribes and castes involved is to postulate a continuum

at one end of which is a society whose political system is entirely of the segmentary egalitarian type, and which contains no dependents whatsoever; and at the other end of which is a society in which segmentary political relations exist only between a very small proportion of the total society, and most people act in the system in the role of dependents.

By dealing with this range of structures, by considering them in effect as a "system of systems," and by describing the process of choice among them, Bailey has indicated the sensitivity and complexity of analysis required to deal adequately with the political systems of the developing nations, and has set a high standard for political anthropology.

<div align="center">THE POLITICAL PROCESS</div>

A significant part of the analytical program of political anthropology is to break down a gross aspect of the political process, such as "input," into its major components, such as supports and demands, or recruitment and socialization. After discussing the major descriptive contributions on these topics for each of the types of political system we have noted, political anthropology could then essay some generalizations that emerge from comparing types. A preliminary sketch along these lines, occupying many pages and dealing with one or two examples of each type, has been provided by Almond and Powell (1967). Obviously, such an analysis cannot be carried out here. This review will simply note some of the major discussions of particular aspects of the political process, more or less disregarding the kind of political system to which they refer—but implying that if this sort of analysis has been found necessary and possible for one kind of political system, some analogue of it is probably necessary and possible for others. An index has been included (pp. 390–92) at the end of the bibliography in order to provide some leads to literature that describes or analyzes aspects of the political process in detail. This is a very preliminary bibliographic control, a more adequate version of which would be very useful to political anthropology. For this reason, it may be worth briefly discussing two difficulties of interpreting the literature of political anthropology in this way.

The first difficulty has been pointed out by Max Gluckman (1965: 174).

Anthropologists have written in general terms, with a few short illustrations, about powers of legislation, without analyzing procedures by which particular pieces of legislation were effected; about administration without analyzing the taking and executing of particular decisions; and about law

without analyzing the attempt to adjust particular disputes. Nor have they analyzed adequately the effects of particular actions of these types on the continuing interaction of the persons concerned.

The second difficulty is that in structurally undifferentiated political systems it is especially hard to sort out politics from administration, or the process by which decisions are made from the process by which public opinion is formed; and these are hard to separate even in apparently differentiated societies. If these distinctions help to indicate the kinds of activities that an explanatory discipline must describe and analyze, then something will have been gained by focusing on them, however briefly. Nevertheless, it remains an open question whether these distinctions are themselves categories with explanatory significance. Once detailed descriptions of process are available, these descriptions may have to be reconceptualized on other lines.

The problem is to deal at length with the cultural content and social organization of the political process in particular societies, while striving for that radical simplification of these facts without which comparison and explanation are impossible. Sketching a theory of innovation in organization, James Q. Wilson (1966) has not only reduced organizational activity to the classical distinction between technology and social organization, but further reduced these to the terms in which they impinge on individual behavior, task structure, and incentive system. This may provide us with a clue to the axes of simplification along which we should proceed. For it may be argued that to represent any political system what we need to know are the cultural definition of an efficacious action, or in other words the ends-means relationships in terms of which political tasks are defined, and the social distribution of incentives for political action. A political system may facilitate or hinder cooperation among political actors, and it may attenuate or exacerbate conflict. In any case, it does so by interposing chains of technological cause and effect between political actors, and by setting up conventions of social behavior through which the actors' activities can be coordinated and the terms of their participation defined. The patterning of successive phases of the political process depends on the culturally available technology, and on the social functions that have been institutionalized at the core of the political system.

Input. It follows that the patterning of political inputs depends on

both the task requirements of the political technology and the anticipated nature and incidence of the political outputs at stake. The problem of input is both technical and social: resources must be brought to bear on the decision-making part of the political system in a technologically relevant form; and usually coalitions must be formed in order to amass the necessary resources. Anthropologists have published little on the input phase of the political process. Even Gluckman, in his list of omissions, does not mention the process of mobilizing support or of articulating and aggregating demands. For indexing purposes we include in this category the processes by which individuals are recruited and socialized into a variety of political roles. There is a considerable literature on principles of recruitment. Less has been written on how they are actually applied, and there is very little on the specifically political aspects of socialization.

Possibly the greatest amount of attention given to inputs by political anthropologists has taken the form of analyses of factions. As examples, we will discuss a monograph by Alan Beals and Bernard Siegel (1966) and an important series of papers by Ralph Nicholas.

Beals and Siegel approach the subject of factions through the analysis of conflict. They define social conflict as an exchange of oppositions, which may be either overt or covert. They then present a typology of conflict based on three factors: the kind of group or relationship involved, the degree to which the conflict is disruptive of a valued organization, and the extent to which conflict either polarizes a group into two opposing groups that are likely to fission, or proliferates between unorganized and transient groupings without leading to fission. Conflict situations can be analyzed by characterizing the external stresses that the environment exerts on the groups and the pattern of internal strains along which conflict is most likely to occur. Stress can be described in terms of such dimensions as covertness, randomness, complexity, duration, curtailment, and selectivity. Factionalism is most likely to develop where external pressure is both covert and selective in its incidence within the group. Strain, as used by these authors, refers to disagreement over the proper means of achieving group goals, or over appropriate behavior in general. Groups that contain many strains may develop factionalism— defined as conflict that leads to a decrease in cooperative activity— because of relatively minor changes in the pattern of external pres-

sures. Beals and Siegel examined two communities that displayed pervasive factionalism. Both were characterized by strategies of social control dependent on threats, reliance on a single, generalized pattern of authority relations based on the family, and ambiguity in various social norms and obligations.

Ralph Nicholas approaches the subject of factions through the analysis of their organization. Examining several societies, he suggests that factions are conflict groups which are not corporate, whose members are recruited by a leader on diverse principles. He illustrates this definition with examples from a West Bengal village and from the Iroquois Indian culture, and concludes that factions perform a constructive function by organizing political conflict (Nicholas 1965). In a later article (1966), Nicholas defines the formal features of one kind of factional political system by analogy to the formal features of segmentary lineage systems, suggesting that in segmentary factional political systems conflict groups are exhaustive, exclusive, and functionally undifferentiated. Factional political systems are characteristic of small-scale political arenas undergoing change; but they are not necessarily the most important organizing feature of all arenas in which they are found, since real political power may reside elsewhere. The number and distribution of factions are closely dependent on the nature and distribution of control over resources. Factional members are usually tied to their leaders by many diverse transactions, in part because leaders have to employ the variety of resources at their disposal to obtain a significant number of followers.

Applying these ideas to an analysis of village politics in southern Asia, Nicholas (1968) distinguishes between vertical cleavages in political systems, where the conflict groups are structurally equal and functionally undifferentiated, and horizontal cleavages, where the conflict groups are stratified and differentiated. Vertical cleavages are likely to be found in villages where control over resources is evenly distributed among cultivating families, and where one dominant caste group includes a majority of the village population; they also appear where resources are held jointly by a dominant caste group organized on segmentary lineage principles. Horizontal cleavages are likely when the dominant caste in the latter situation loses its numerical advantage to lower-ranking, traditionally dependent castes. Horizontal cleavages are less frequent than vertical ones in Indian villages,

and occur mostly where resources are concentrated in the hands of a very few persons. The most usual situation is a combination of horizontal and vertical cleavages.

Finally, in a still more comprehensive article Nicholas has offered "a scheme for discussing social structure when social process is at the center of attention." He attempts to delineate the various rules and resources that make up the environment of political action. He suggests that "account must be taken of the conceptions of rules, resources, and restraints held by the actors in the system, as well as of the analyst's conception of the system" (Nicholas 1968: 300). Resources are divided into material and human. Rules are divided into moral principles, jural rules, technical facts, pragmatic rules, and regularities, each of which contributes to structuring behavior in the pursuit and use of power. These environmental components enter into the calculations of rational political actors, who are trying to attain their goals with the least cost and greatest likelihood of success—a calculation whose accuracy depends in part on the stability or instability of the relation of rules to resources. (For some related remarks, see the Conclusion to this review.) Nicholas describes two Indian villages with very similar configurations of rules and resources, but different configurations of political activities; he attributes the difference to the dissimilarity of the villagers' external environments.

The concept of faction is perhaps the most distinctively anthropological approach to the study of inputs to a political system. A focus on the organizational characteristics of factions themselves has served to carry anthropology beyond an exclusive concern with the primary structural parameters of premodern social systems to an interest in the secondary manipulation of those structural principles. It has also contributed to the analysis of conflict in "parapolitical" systems with widely differing distributions of power. This emphasis on the importance of contracts in linking statuses shows signs, like an earlier emphasis in the opposite direction, of spreading from the Indian village communities to which it was first applied to the analysis of political systems of all types. Accordingly, it is important to inquire into its explanatory adequacy. An implication of recent formulations in political science is that rather than focusing only on the sociological characteristics of political groups, one should consider the systemic characteristics of the political system and political pro-

cess as a whole (Lowi 1964, Huntington 1968). A concern for such systemic analysis is, it may be argued, what Beals and Siegel are driving at, and what Nicholas has been driving toward. It has been argued here that the patterning of inputs depends not only on the incidence of stress from the external environment and the pattern of strain on the input side, but also on the technology at the core of the political system and the nature and incidence of the anticipated outputs. Nicholas's partitioning of the ends-means relationships perceived by the political actor is a helpful step toward taking political technology into account. What seems to be missing is a characterization of the political issues at stake that promises to have more explanatory force.

Conversion. The technology at the core of a political system consists of those procedures for translating resources into outcomes that are common enough to play a part in orienting the expectations and defining the strategies of competing political actors. Just as the production functions of every economy reflect the availability and relative cost of land, labor, and capital, and the efficiency of the process of organization that brings them together, it may be argued that the conversion functions in every political system reflect the availability and relative cost of the resources for exercising normative, coercive, and remunerative power, and the skillfulness of the management that converts them into control over behavior (Etzioni 1961). These conversion functions particularly reflect the factor endowments prevalent at the time of their institutionalization, and perform more or less well as changes in these endowments occur. (For analogous discussions see Stinchcombe 1965 and Orans 1968.)

It is characteristic of highly institutionalized political systems that resources must be converted into a technically adequate and socially approved form before they can be cashed in at the core as influence over outcomes. The definition of these conversion processes strongly affects the outcomes that can be achieved with given resources, whether this effect is thought of as fair or unfair, stabilizing or destabilizing. One distinctive contribution of anthropology to the analysis of the core of the political system is the description of political systems with a wide range of technologies phrased in a variety of cultural idioms. One particularly sensitive and systematic analysis of the transactions in a political system with exotic intervening variables

and complex conversion paths is Mary Douglas's monograph on the Lele of Kasai (Douglas 1963a).

Douglas refers to her monograph as a study in the failure of authority. The Lele live in autonomous villages in which there is a substantial redistribution of wealth and authority into the hands of older men, even though the younger men are the most effective economic producers. On the other hand, there is a balance of power between competing pairs of age-grades, each pair containing an older and a younger grade. Redistribution is effected through a "prestige economy" based on an artificial commodity that young men pay to older men to obtain wives, gain admittance to village associations, and clear themselves in damage suits. Another complex system for transferring claims is the payment of blood debts in compensation for deaths caused by sorcery or sex pollution. Altogether, there are four ranked spheres of exchange: transfer of rights over persons, prestations, barter, and subsistence exchange. In each of these, resources circulate upward because no one voluntarily converts them downward. Accusations of sorcery, in which the advantage is basically with the younger men, and poison ordeals for the testing of these accusations, through which some contestants for political authority can arbitrarily be removed from competition, play an important part in the political system. Douglas observes that so long as the Lele system involved a distribution of status and authority at variance with the distribution of basic economic power, indirect techniques of political control were certain to be used. She also notes that the political conflict aroused between older and younger men in the village by the steeply redistributive allocation of young women is displaced into the intervillage arena by encouraging the young men to raid other villages for women, restoring village solidarity and reducing that among villages.

In a more theoretical essay, Douglas (1967) argues that the artificial tokens used in restricted spheres of exchange should be regarded as coupons or licenses in a system of political control. She expects such primitive rationing systems to emerge "where there is some danger that the effective demand for scarce resources may so disturb the pattern of distribution as to threaten a given social order." Primitive coupons do not represent generalized purchasing power; rather, their acquisition and distribution is controlled, creating patron-client rela-

tionships. Their main function is to provide the necessary condition for achieving and maintaining high status, or for countering attacks on status. Essentially, they reduce or eliminate competition.

Output. The output side of the political system is the process by which values and costs are delivered to or imposed on those in the population to whom they have been allocated. This process has technical and social components of its own, reflecting the technology available for bringing resources to bear at a distance and the social control that must be exercised over those implementing policy. Max Weber's comparative analysis of output structures focused on the alternative configurations of technical and social relationships through which administrative objectives could be achieved, and particularly on the administrative arrangements under which resources were concentrated and translated into military power (Weber 1968, Andreski 1968). In regard to any governmental function, however, it may be argued that a rational system will try to minimize the cost of administration to the central government without incurring unacceptable costs of political vulnerability or environmental maladaptation. In premodern societies, depending on the distribution of resources and interests, this might mean paying for a specialized administrative organization; or it might mean displacing as many functions and costs as possible onto an extragovernmental network of social relationships.

Ira Lapidus provides a striking study of the complementary nature of bureaucracy and clientage in his analysis of Muslim cities in the later middle ages (Lapidus 1967). He examines the relationship between military regimes composed of slave castes and the urban communities they ruled, exploring the contrast between Asian and European urban forms. Muslim society was relatively undifferentiated, with one unspecialized stratum of professional, religious, and commercial notables playing all the crucial political, economic, and cultural roles. In contrast, European society was relatively segmented, and the variety of interests and functions divided the urban population into culturally and emotionally supported classes. In Muslim cities public affairs were conducted through a comprehensive and diffuse system of social relationships and cultural values. In Europe, "A highly divided society required formal agencies for the defense of

special interests or the coordination of diverse interests within the towns" (p. 187). The alien Mamluks, who manned the institutions of central government in Muslim society, ruled not through bureaucracy but by gathering patron-client chains in their hands. The key to the system was the personal tie between individual Mamluks and particular circles of *ulama*, judges, and sheiks. The Mamluks also maintained direct contacts with the common people. "Having enlisted the cooperation of the notables, atomized the common people, and contained lumpenproletariat violence, the Mamluks by the logic of these relationships prevented the formation of alternative configurations of rule" (p. 190).

A basic problem of the output side of the political system is securing compliance with regulations. In an important article, Martin Orans (1968: 876, 877) suggests that the economic analysis of regulated prices might serve as a model for investigating the relations among rules, conformity, desires, and sanctions in general.

In such an analysis we anticipate that insofar as the fixed price departs from the market price, there will be either unsatisfied demand or oversupply, and that these tendencies will exert a pressure toward violation of the regulation. Insofar as the regulation is followed in spite of such discrepancy between the market and regulated price we infer that the sanctions behind the regulation are sufficient to deter such violation, and/or that some internal sanction system (internal to the actors) is effective, e.g., patriotism. The greater the discrepancy between the regulated price and the market price, the greater must be the strength of the external and/or internal sanctions to maintain adherence to the regulated price.

In some instances it will pay the dominant caste to allow the price to rise, just as in some instances it will pay the dominant caste to allow people to alter their service relationships.

Orans posits three kinds of sanctions, which are equivalent to Etzioni's normative, coercive, and remunerative powers, and argues that concentrated secular political and economic power must underlie any ritual hierarchy. As an example, he formulates the general characteristics of the Hindu *jajmani* system, and states the equilibrium conditions for such a system. His model, which centers on the concentration of political power needed to prevent shifts in relative wealth, shows a good fit with data from 54 instances of South Asian caste relations.

External processes. Politics occur on a potentially continuous spectrum, on which capability and solidarity decrease as technical and social distance increase. However, social conventions may define clear boundaries between zones of this continuum in which particular political means are required or prohibited and particular political goals are likely or unlikely to be shared. The historical increase in the spatial and demographic size of political communities basically reflects an increase in the range of political technology, together with an appreciation of the necessity for collective defense and the unacceptability of unregulated violence as a political instrument in areas of frequent interaction. Where the boundary between internal and external political process is drawn depends on the cost of delivering positive and negative sanctions at a given distance, a function that may not be linear (Boulding 1962; Wohlstetter, in Kaplan 1968).

Despite these technical facts and social conventions, however, the distinction between the internal and external aspects of the political system is partially undermined by two considerations. First, a system may not allocate its resources for external relations with regard to the effect of its decisions on the external environment. Instead, it may be most concerned with the domestic implications of the internal reallocation of resources that the external project requires (Lowi 1967). Second, the full range of means of political alliance and antagonism, while they may differ in the relative cost and relative effectiveness with which they can be employed at various distances from the political center, are nevertheless available for deployment in either arena.

Taking the positive or cooperative side of external relations first, let us consider Uberoi's *Politics of the Kula Ring* (1962), a careful statement of the role of exchange in primitive political systems and an important document in the reorientation of social anthropology along political lines. Reanalyzing Malinowski's detailed reports, Uberoi sees *kula* politics as an integrating activity at three levels in Trobriand society: within and among local lineages, among independent but occasionally intermarrying districts of one island, and among unrelated and potentially hostile islands. Rejecting Malinowski's suggestion that rank allocates resources, Uberoi argues that resources create rank, and that the competition for and contingent validation of rank is conducted through *kula* exchanges. The rank of a local lin-

eage is the outcome of three factors: physical advantages like fertile gardens or good fishing; the extent to which the lineage integrates the economic activities of its neighbors; and the lineage's position in the network of overseas alliances. Neither rank nor headmanship implies automatic authority. Such power and influence as a chief exercises he owes to his position as the head of a polygamous household and to his consequent control of the wealth owned by himself and his wives. *Kula* expeditions to other islands, which mobilize the men of the society into political activity, serve both to establish ties of cooperation with other groups and to define an arena of competition among those who are away from home. The *kula* valuables "represent to the normally kin-bound individuals of these small stateless societies the highest point of their legitimate individual interest, and also the interest of the widest political association of which they all partake" (Uberoi 1962: 160).

As for the negative or antagonistic side of external relations, Andrew Vayda (1968) has summarized the hypotheses of various writers concerning the economic, demographic, political, and psychological consequences of war in some primitive societies. Horses and camels may be redistributed among peoples, or peoples redistributed over the land. Demographic fluctuations in small groups may be counteracted by the capture of more people, and pressure on resources may be reduced by mortality in warfare and by the economic and medical disturbances caused by war. The number, frequency, or magnitude of the offenses committed against a group may be reduced by the threat of reprisal. Anxiety, tension, and hostility in a society may be kept within certain limits by external warfare. Vayda's own work has portrayed primitive warfare as adaptive to particular ecological circumstances. For example, he constructs two models of warfare among expanding slash-and-burn agriculturalists (Vayda 1961). The first model involves a chain reaction of wars among tribes as one tribe pushes outward from an overcrowded area. The second model, for areas in which land is less scarce, involves relative intertribal peace, accompanied by peaceful mechanisms for redistributing population. Vayda notes that warlike expansion does not presuppose actual crowding, but only the anticipation of crowding; and that the crowding may be in relation not to gross territory, but to desirable types or locations of land. These considerations reflect an important theme

in some recent publications on primitive war: namely, that it may be an instrument in a rationally conceived and pursued foreign policy (Arhin 1967).

Somewhat similarly, N. A. Chagnon (1968a) has provided an extensive description of the Yanomamö alliance system, in which the objective is not land, but group autonomy and security. He notes the similarities between this intergroup system and contemporary international relations, including such features as nonterritorial motives for warfare, assertion of autonomy through displays of force, unstable but compulsory alliances, and a preoccupation with survival. Kenneth Boulding would probably say that these similarities exist because the nuclear area of each group or nation is continually threatened by other groups, so that each group is only "conditionally viable" (Boulding 1962). Boulding's ideas suggest that comparisons of primitive and modern war should search out those situations in which the relationships among distance, technical capacity, and social arrangements are analogous, regardless of the absolute distances, technological levels, and social forms involved. The comparison of transitions between system states defined in this way should be particularly instructive; and we may find that analogous processes have occurred wherever political community has been consolidated on an increasing scale.

In an interesting series of articles, Keith Otterbein has explored some of the determinants of primitive war. His articles on the Iroquois and the Zulu stress the importance of innovations in weapons and tactics in shifting the advantage among warring groups. The Iroquois held such an advantage at three separate periods in a constantly evolving relationship among weapons, armor, and mobility (Otterbein 1964b). During the evolution of Zulu warfare, casualty rates and levels of political organization varied as the techniques and goals of warfare progressed from duels between acephalous tribes, through battles of subjugation and conquest among chiefdoms and primitive states, to long-distance campaigns conducted by an empire (Otterbein 1964a). Considering the effects of feuding and internal war on social structure, Otterbein concludes that these activities are associated cross-culturally with the presence of fraternal interest groups. However, officials in centralized systems appear to be able to prevent

unauthorized raiding parties against nearby groups, and may inter-
vene to prevent feuding when there is war (Otterbein and Swanson
1965, Otterbein 1968).

ENVIRONMENTAL SYSTEMS

There are many ways of conceptualizing the relationship between
what is happening in politics and what is happening alongside of
politics. For example, an environmental system may be politically
relevant because of its direct effects on the political system, because
of the direct effects of the political system on it, or because it pro-
vides an alternative to politics. However, there are two basic choices
to be made. First, should we think of the environment of the political
system as a series of discrete events, or as a concatenation of systems?
Second, should we think of the political system and the various com-
ponents of its environment as separate systems with implications for
each other, or as a series of collaborative systems that cross-cut the
analytical boundary between politics and its environment? The first
decision is methodological: Are we going to concentrate exclusively
on systemic characteristics internal to politics, considering the rele-
vant transactions with the environment as adequately represented in
the linkage variables of inputs and outputs? Or are we also going to
try to maintain in our analytical image the systemic characteristics of
the myriad systems that impinge on politics? The second decision is
empirical: Have we been correct in implying that "politics" is most
fruitfully regarded as a natural system of variables more related to
each other than an any exogenous variables? Or are the variations in
some exogenous variables so regularly associated with variations in
the political system that the political and nonpolitical variables can
usefully be thought of as forming a system in themselves?

If one chooses the first, and perhaps more prudent, alternative in
both cases, as we did in the previous section, one follows David
Easton in treating the environment as a black box that generates
random shocks and has a feedback loop from output to input. If one
chooses the second, more complicated, alternative in both cases, one
tries to do for the political system and the systems in its environment
what Clifford Geertz (1963a) has done with culture and ecology.

This mode of analysis is a sort which trains attention on the pervasive prop-
erties of systems *qua* systems . . . rather than on point-to-point relation-
ships between paired variables of the "culture" and "nature" variety. The
guiding question shifts from: "Do habitat conditions . . . cause culture or
do they merely limit it?" to such incisive questions as "Given an ecosystem
defined through the parallel discrimination of culture core and relevant en-
vironment, how is it organized?"

How the pairing of the political and any particular environmental
system should be formulated, and to what extent it will turn out to
be empirically relevant, cannot be decided here. This is simply the
theoretical context in which a few relevant publications about each
of these possible connections will be reviewed.

Ecology and demography. The relationship of political systems to
the ecological and demographic dynamics of their environments is
a critical problem for both the history and future of political evolu-
tion; it is also a topic on which the societies studied by anthropolo-
gists provide crucial evidence. The adjustment of a social system to
its ecology and demography may or may not be handled by a political
process; but the specific patterning of these environmental challenges
and the specific patterning of the social response to them define some
of the constraints on the political system and some of the opportuni-
ties presented to it. Particularly fundamental is the spatial and tem-
poral distribution of activities and populations—not only activities
and populations of human beings, but also those of animals and those
of human groups, formal organizations, and political systems. These
distributions obviously define to a large extent where, physically, the
points of political cooperation and conflict are likely to be. When the
description and analysis of these distributions reach the level of com-
pleteness and precision that such recent work as that of G. William
Skinner (1964–65) suggests is required, we should be able to visu-
alize the dimensions and dynamics of premodern political systems
with a new clarity.

In his study of the role of ritual in the ecology of the New Guinea
Maring, Roy Rappaport (1967) suggests, in effect, that the Maring
ritual cycle is a structural alternative to a hierarchically ordered po-
litical system. The ritual state of a Maring community records and
summarizes the relationship of the local population to both human
and nonhuman components of their environment. It also assembles

and codes information, and transmits it between autonomous local populations who ally for warfare or defense. In terms of the numbers of people involved and the frequency with which they are mobilized, the aggregations formed by ritual cycles rival those of some Polynesian chiefdoms. Each has certain advantages. In the Polynesian system, since the chief can initiate action without consulting others, the signals from the environment can be weaker, and the variety of corrective programs can be greater. The advantage of the Maring system is that responses are defined by convention: there is less room for human error, and it is possible to regulate relationships between local groups who do not respect a common authority. The ritual cycle depends basically on the number of pigs that Maring women can care for, and on the length of time it takes to acquire them. As population density increases, the frequency of the occasions when it is permissible to attack neighboring groups rises; warfare both reduces population and redistributes it over the land.

Robert Stevenson begins his book on *Population and Political Systems in Tropical Africa* (1968) by citing evidence from North and South America, Europe, and Asia to show that population density and state formation are closely correlated in those areas. He wonders why, according to Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, the same is not true for Africa. Noting that Bartholomew and Birdsell consider population density to be the "most critical single ecological datum," Stevenson suggests that the relationship between population and politics is a crucial juncture, at which "the principles of biological evolution and those of socio-cultural evolution intersect," in that the state is an adaptive institution. He analyzes each of the societies discussed in *African Political Systems*, surveys African political and population geography, and discusses a major deviation from his own hypothesis— that in Africa, too, population densities are generally higher at state than at nonstate levels. In the course of this vigorous analysis, the variety of demographic and social processes and the variety of possible relationships between them are clearly illustrated. Stevenson's argument is essentially divided into two parts: revising Fortes and Evans-Pritchard's account of states that appear to have low densities, and revising their account of what appear to be high-density areas that have no states.

The low-density Zulu and Ngoni states, which Stevenson regards

as part of a shock wave generated by the collision between south-
ward-expanding Bantu and northward-penetrating Europeans, were
essentially predatory and probably transitory systems, with a differ-
ent relationship to resources and population than the larger and more
stable states of the Sudan or Lacustrine areas. The low-density Ng-
wato state, as described in *African Political Systems*, was British-
imposed, not indigenous; and even preliminary conclusions about
the origins and nature of indigenous Tswana political organization
must await the outcome of ongoing historical research by Abraham
and others. The low-density Bemba state, also described in *African
Political Systems*, has the form of a state without the substance. It was
originally based on a monopoly of trade in slaves and ivory, but this
trade was ended by the British in the 1890's. When some temporal
controls are put on the relationship between population density and
political organization, it emerges that the Bemba entered a sparsely
populated area with a low level of political organization; that when
they imposed a higher level of political organization on the area,
population densities began to go up; and that the turmoil accom-
panying the decline of the Bemba state caused a decline in popula-
tion density. This sequence of events supports rather than controverts
Stevenson's correlation between higher political forms and higher
population densities.

Stevenson also considers high-density areas without states. The Tal-
lensi are a fragment of the Mamprusi state, and were partially cut
off from it when they were defeated by the British. They may actu-
ally live in the very area in which the Mamprusi, Mossi, and Da-
gombi states first developed. The high-density but acephalous Logoli
illustrate conditions that cause most of the exceptions in Stevenson's
wider survey. Some live in small areas adjacent to indigenous states,
areas that were perhaps formerly part of these states or buffer zones
between states. Others live in areas subject to colonial pressures,
which can strikingly raise density. Perhaps most interesting of all is
the Ibo case. Stevenson argues that the ritual, military, and economic
organization of the Aro traders, who succeeded in controlling the
major local resource of trade routes and dispersed markets, approxi-
mates state organization.

Economy and society. Economic, social, and political systems affect
each other because of the specific organizational forms and distribu-

tion of resources with which they confront each other. Stanley Udy's cross-cultural study of the *Organization of Work* (1959) illustrates the effects of the specific patterning of economic and political organization on each other, and provides one example of an organization-theoretic approach that should be applied to primitive and traditional political systems. Udy begins by identifying four dimensions of the technologies that are employed by primitive economies: complexity, work load, outlay, and uncertainty. He finds that complex technological processes tend to have bureaucratic authority structures, whereas simple processes tend to be associational. However, task complexity does not necessarily produce rational administration, and technology predicts only authority structure well. Examining the relationship between organizational structure and society, Udy defines five forms of recruitment and asks how they are related to type of organization. Surprisingly, he finds that in his sample the more bureaucratic organizations tend to be economically irrational, whereas the non-bureaucratic ones tend to be rational. He suggests that under centralized government, custodial forms of organization spread to all technologies, displacing voluntary forms and coexisting with familial ones. Control of outlay, in particular of land, may contribute to the superimposition and generalization of custodial forms; since custodial forms occur in stratified societies, they may be based on nongovernmental power backed by the government. All of this has implications for the economic potential of those underdeveloped countries that have traditionally had settled agriculture and centralized government, since it suggests that these countries may have particularly irrational forms of economic administration. Udy suggests that reward systems may provide the incentives to work that are not provided by institutionalization in itself.

A critical problem for political anthropology is the extent to which, in different societies, sectors other than the explicitly political allocate values and manage resources. If crucial allocations of wealth, status, or power in a society are being made by the economy, mass media, or educational system, then, whether we want to call these allocations political or not, we certainly cannot ignore them. The extent to which economic, social, or political problems are being handled outside the political system must affect our total picture of how allocations in a society are made and our evaluation of the performance of its politi-

cal system. An interesting discussion of the process of allocation in
general and the different role of the political system in different soci-
eties in particular is Gerhard Lenski's *Power and Privilege* (1966).
Lenski starts from the assumption that power will determine the allo-
cation of nearly all the social product that men do not find it neces-
sary to share with those on whom they depend. On this basis, he
attempts to account for both the common and the variable features
of "distributive systems" in types of societies ranging from hunter-
gatherer to modern industrial. Following anthropologists, Lenski sees
hunter-gatherer and simple horticultural societies as relatively egali-
tarian, inequality in material possessions being converted into in-
equality in prestige. In advanced horticultural societies, which have
more efficient technologies, dramatically larger populations, and more
advanced political systems, inequality achieves a new order of mag-
nitude. With the separation of politics and kinship, the most impor-
tant determinant of steepness of stratification is level of political
development, and the most important determinant of stratification
position is access to state power, in particular relationship to an
immediate superior. Politically determined inequality reaches a peak
in traditional agrarian societies, being somewhat moderated in indus-
trial societies by a more equal distribution of power.

Cognition and motivation. Psychological political anthropology is
not a flourishing subject. It would be possible, of course, to take the
some fifteen hundred publications on psychological anthropology
listed in the last five editions of the *Biennial Review* and argue that
something analogous could be done on a political subject. However,
this reviewer knows of very few articles by psychological anthro-
pologists on explicitly political topics, though that may simply reflect
his ignorance.

An interesting article is Robert Levine's comparison (1960a) of the
values toward authority and aggression in two East African societies
having segmentary lineage systems. The Nuer and Gusii are similar
in size, organization, and overall colonial situation. They differ in the
adjustment of individuals to leadership roles in the colonial judicial
system and in the persistence of feuding. The Nuer are reluctant to
assume positions of authority and inflict punishments, and feuding
has persisted; the Gusii are eager to judge their fellows and impose
severe penalties on them, and litigation has replaced the blood feud.

Nuer political values are egalitarian and encourage aggressive behavior; Gusii political values are authoritarian and discourage interpersonal aggression. Levine does not argue that child training practices are the ultimate cause of these differences, suggesting that the ultimate explanation may be an ecological one. Rather, he concentrates on analyzing the process by which political values are internalized by individuals in each society. Nuer children have warm, demonstrative fathers who do not beat them physically; Gusii children have remote, frightening fathers who are severely punitive. Nuer parents encourage their children to be aggressive; Gusii parents forbid fighting and require that disputes be referred to adults for settlement. Levine concludes that societies with segmentary lineage political systems need not be politically similar in other respects; and that to understand contemporary political behavior in these societies it is necessary to take account of traditional political values that continue to be transmitted from generation to generation.

Psychological political anthropology is presumably concerned with the process by which individuals internalize politically relevant aspects of their culture and externalize them in politically relevant behavior. It is also interested in influences on the political process that result from the distinctive characteristics of individual personality systems and the distribution of these characteristics in a society. The teasing out of these influences is likely to prove rather more complicated than asking at what age a child learns the name of the President of the United States, or even than establishing gross contrasts in modal personality between cultures. In particular, one wants to know the particular repertoire of behavioral instincts, skills, and strategies that different psychological types bring to situations of political cooperation and conflict. The political system itself may be more or less obtrusive in defining these patterns of behavior. In some cultures, economic socialization may establish the basic behavioral repertoire on which political behavior draws; in other cultures, distinctively intrafamilial socialization may do so. In still others, specifically political socialization may set the pattern for economy and society. These subjects remain, however, relatively unexplored.

Instrumental and expressive culture. The group characteristics of collective representations and the highly standardized aspects of collective behavior are among the oldest topics of political analysis. One

looks forward to remarkable contributions by cultural anthropologists to the analysis of political ideologies, whether the meticulous dissections of componential analysts or the sweeping insights of a Lévi-Strauss. However, to the best of my knowledge, neither formal nor structural methods have yet been applied in an extended analysis of specifically political culture. Meanwhile, major contributions to the analysis of the political aspects of ritual continue to appear.

In a recent monograph on Ndembu ritual, Victor Turner (1968a) has placed the relationship between politics and ritual squarely in the foreground. He posits two kinds of social systems: cyclical or repetitive systems, characterized by adherence to axiomatic values and the periodic dramatization of these values; and changing systems, characterized by quarrels, disputes, or factional struggles, but not by dramas. Social dramas sever the ties of one cycle of development in social structure and purify the social group in preparation for a new one. The unity of a ritual is a dramatic unity whose rules apparently leave little scope for competition; but ritual nevertheless plays a crucial political role. Turner's model of phases in the political process, and his dramatistic analysis of social disintegration and reintegration in general, strongly resemble a cultural analysis of themes in Western literature offered by the literary critic Northrop Frye (1957). Frye sees the basic elements of all literary plots as having four phases: *anagnorisis*, the crystallization of a new social grouping, usually around a heroic figure; *agon*, the outbreak of conflict within the society or between the hero and his enemies; *catastrophe*, the defeat of the society or hero at the hands of superior forces; and *sparagmos*, the disintegration of society or dismemberment of the hero and the scattering of social forces. The many intriguing dimensions and explicitly political concerns in this theory of literature should be suggestive for the cultural analysis of political myth and ritual by anthropologists.

A complementary approach, both substantively and methodologically, is Guy Swanson's *The Birth of the Gods* (1960). Rather than exploring the cultural patterning of politics, Swanson explores Philip Rieff's suggestion that "all theologies are metaphors of politics." Elaborating the direction of inquiry originated by Durkheim, Swanson argues: "the belief in a particular kind of spirit springs from experi-

ence with a type of persisting sovereign group whose area of juris-
diction corresponds to that attributed to the spirit" (p. 175). In Swan-
son's sample of fifty societies, monotheism, for example, tends to
appear in societies that contain three or more types of autonomous
groups ranked in hierarchical order; a single high god is perhaps
seen as bringing unity to this diversity. In polytheistic societies the
number of superior deities is positively and significantly related to
the number of specialties compatible with the society's ultimately
sovereign organization. The belief that ancestral spirits are active
in human affairs tends to occur in societies with sovereign kinship
groups other than the nuclear family. A belief in witchcraft tends to
occur where legitimated social controls are absent.

<div align="center">CONCLUSION</div>

Let us conclude this overview by asking ourselves where recent
political anthropology fits into earlier theoretical formulations in so-
cial anthropology.* A convenient point of reference is Nadel's *Theory
of Social Structure* (1957). It may be argued that Nadel, asking him-
self what tied shreds and patches of only partially interrelated roles
into a single social structure, answered: "politics." Nadel states ab-
stractly a theme that recurs in this review: political anthropology is
an important subject not only because it tells us about "government"
in premodern societies, but also because a political point of view has
a role to play in rethinking some of the foundations of social anthro-
pology.

Nadel was addressing himself to the following problem. Some so-
cial roles never have any concrete contact with each other; and even
contiguous roles are not directly comparable, owing to qualitative
differences in their aim-contents. What, then, is the greatest extent
to which we can aggregate diverse relationships between roles into
a single order that is both concrete enough to be socially significant
and abstract enough to be transposable from one structure to another
for comparative purposes? Rejecting purely sociometric or interac-

tive approaches, Nadel proposed two criteria. The first, differential command over one another's actions, applied to roles "which we know to involve specific relationships with actors in other roles, and which are rendered incomparable only by the qualitative diversity of the relationships" (Nadel 1957: 115). The second criterion, differential command over existing benefits or resources, applies both to these roles and to roles in which there is no direct interaction. It reinterprets the notion of "roles played relative to one another" in terms of an extraneous reference point: the total pool of values for which the actors are competing.

These two types of command are analogous to the legal distinction between rights *in persona* and rights *in rem*, which Max Gluckman, for example, has discussed in simpler language (Gluckman 1965: 84). However, Nadel has an additional point to make. The criterion of differential command over resources and benefits might appear to describe the momentary distribution of benefits and powers among categories of people in the society, without reference to the process of interaction through which this allocation was made.

But this is not so. Since such access always has something to do with command people exercise over one another, it is also to that extent evidence of interactive alignments. Let me put it this way: it is because other people facilitate or hinder my attainment of certain commonly valued benefits that I in fact attain them in such-and-such measure. More generally speaking, it is in consequence of all the possible relationships between actors that each actor also receives his allocation of benefits: so that the measure of this allocation also synthesizes numerous, perhaps all, interactive relationships and demonstrates their interlocking. (Nadel 1957: 119.)

Nadel remarks that if others consider the social structure he envisages to be little more than a "power, authority, or status structure," he would reply that this is the only dimension "sufficiently abstract for our purposes and still sufficiently relevant, in the sense of being important in human and social existence" (p. 122).

In an important paper, which is perhaps the best example so far of the sort of analysis Nadel was recommending, F. G. Bailey (1968) has tried to construct a model of how resources are accumulated by political actors, what kinds of rules apply to the use of these resources, and how the resources are actually converted into political power through confrontations and encounters. A political structure

consists of rules about the prizes that are being sought, the people who are allowed to participate, and the procedures that may be followed. These rules may be either normative or pragmatic: that is, they may provide public justification for conduct, or they may be technical prescriptions for success. Bailey applies this model to the analysis of three kinds of political conflict in Bisipara, India. The first conflict situation involves recurrent confrontations between factions, a conflict governed by normative and technical rules by which both sides abide. The second is a cumulative process, governed by technical but not by normative rules, through which a political actor with a low rank in the normatively defined political structure accumulates nonpolitical resources and subversively translates them into political assets without destroying the overall structure. In the third process there is no consensus on either normative or technical rules. (In Bailey's example, the third situation arose when one party employed political resources from outside the village that were not recognized as even pragmatically legitimate by the other party.) The third situation is likely to terminate in a struggle in which resources are expended; and in the long run, both the normative and technical rules defining the political structure are likely to be transformed. Bailey says that he hopes to elaborate his model to handle all types of conflict in village India, and eventually to handle politics in all parapolitical or only partially independent political systems. Here is certainly something to look forward to.

Nadel himself (1957) notes that in order to apply his program two things are necessary: first, we must know, however vaguely, the preference ordering of the actors in our society; second, we must be able to measure, however approximately, the differentials in command over the actions of others and command over resources and benefits. Whatever economists would say about the first requirement, political scientists have found the second very complicated (Hawley and Wirt 1961). A useful formulation, which fits very nicely with the way some writers on political anthropology have been discussing the matter, is that of Robert Dahl. Dahl distinguishes four components of political power: the *base* of an actor's power, which consists of all the resources that he can exploit in order to affect the behavior of others; the *means*, or mediating activity, through which A exploits his base in order to alter B's behavior; the *scope* of matters in which B responds

to A's power; and the *amount* of A's power over B, that is, the proba-
bility that A, using particular means with regard to a particular do-
main, will gain B's compliance. These four distinctions imply a pro-
gram of analysis for political anthropology that is not usually system-
atically contemplated. I shall spend a few pages in outlining Dahl's
program because I believe that it relates directly to the theoretical
program suggested by Nadel, as well as to those on which a number
of recent writers on political anthropology have embarked.

First, we need some dimensions of variation in the *base,* that is, the
type of resources on which power is based. These dimensions might
involve, for example, the cost of the smallest unit into which a re-
source could be disaggregated, or the type and number of different
kinds of transactions in which it was negotiable. When resources can-
not be disaggregated, power will tend to be highly concentrated. This
is often the case with expensive military technologies, relatively ex-
pensive forms of wealth such as cattle, or cultural values whose mono-
polization requires large investments of time and money. Conversely,
where resources can be disaggregated into inexpensive units, power
will tend to be relatively dispersed. As regards negotiability, it might
be argued that physical force prevails regardless of cultural defini-
tions, that the use of money requires a considerable degree of con-
sensus and trust, and that prestige is highly specific to the cultural
definition of given situations.

Second, we need ways of identifying politically significant varia-
tions in *means* or types of mediating activity. For example, we might
distinguish between extensive and intensive strategies for allocating
incentives. An extensive strategy is one in which a relatively large
number of people are subject to a severe or highly rewarding sanction,
but in which the probability that any particular person will incur the
sanction is relatively low. Such a strategy allows one to guarantee
that a particular kind of behavior will not deviate from a given rate of
occurrence, provided one is willing to accept a random incidence of
that behavior among the population one is controlling. An intensive
strategy is one in which a relatively small group is the object of the
sanction, the scale of sanctions is finely graded to the qualities of the
behavior under control, and the probability that each person will ob-
tain a reward or incur a penalty is relatively high. Such a strategy

allows one not only to guarantee a certain rate of a certain kind of be-havior, but also to guarantee that the behavior will be performed by particular people, at particular times and places, in a particular order, and with a particular degree of reliability. Obviously, an extensive strategy is much cheaper in resources but much less effective in guar-anteeing particular results.

These two strategies can each be applied to coercion, remuneration, and normative power. The extensive strategy for coercion is to place as many different kinds of structural units as possible into opposition with each other in as many ways as possible, to intervene with coer-cion only to restore the balance between competing segments, and then to intervene as indirectly and as seldom as possible—in other words, divide and rule. The intensive strategy is to attempt to monitor the behavior of all members of society at all times, threatening them with physical punishment. The extensive strategy for remuneration is to restrict rewards to the minimal number of winners necessary to keep a maximal number of players in competition; the intensive stra-tegy is to guarantee to everyone in the system a reward proportional to fixed standards of right or performance. The extensive strategy for normative power is to cut across the ranking system in as few places as possible, partitioning it into a minimum of two formal status groups separated by a "status schism" (Caplow 1964); the intensive strategy is to maintain a finely differentiated hierarchy of status distinctions between the successive social or bureaucratic ranks. One can make many predictions from this model once either level of spending or level of required performance is specified, particularly if one can spe-cify the functional interdependencies and optimal allocation of re-sources among the three kinds of power. As regards interdependence, for example, prestige usually presupposes wealth, and control of prop-erty usually presupposes access to coercion. Optimal allocation de-pends on the relative costs of the kinds of resources needed to exercise the three kinds of power, and on the kinds of goals, tasks, or behaviors that are at stake (Etzioni 1961).

Third, we need dimensions of variation for specifying the *scope* of politically relevant goals, tasks, or behaviors. There is little hope of building explanatory models of primitive political systems if the jobs these systems do for their participants are not specified and analyzed.

The distinctions of explanatory significance here may be divided into two kinds: those relating to the requirements for effective performance of the tasks involved in achieving particular kinds of goals, and those relating to the political implications of the resource allocations required for achieving goals.

Amitai Etzioni has compared the organizational requirements for achieving order, economic goals, and ideological goals, as for example in a prison, a factory, or a church (Etzioni 1961; see also Skinner and Winckler 1969). Etzioni classifies goals, power, and involvement, and discusses the relative effectiveness of congruent and incongruent combinations of these. Coercive power induces alienation and is most effective in achieving order goals. Remunerative power induces a calculative involvement and is most appropriate to economic goals. Normative power induces commitment and is most effective in achieving ideological goals. A particular series of structural correlates is likely to accompany the institutionalization of any one or any combination of these modes of operation. This systematic exploration of a fairly commonsense typology is useful in analyzing the requirements for task performance in political systems as a whole.

R. A. Dahl's pioneering work on the political implications of resource allocations has been given a brilliantly promising formulation by Theodore Lowi (Dahl 1961, Lowi 1964). Broadly speaking, these authors argue that different kinds of policy issues will activate coalitions of different membership, size, and stability, will be decided at different points in the institutional structure within which politics occurs, and will result, when decisions are implemented, in a different pattern of effects on the population involved. Lowi distinguishes distributive, regulative, and redistributive policies, regarding them as, in effect, three basic functions of government. *Distributive* policies involve passing out a large number of small favors to as many clients as request them. The result is a conflict-free political arena in which individual clients approach patrons for a share of the resources. *Regulative* policies involve granting or withholding benefits and imposing or withdrawing penalties on individual clients within a framework of consistent rules that apply to some sector of social activity. Coalitions of interested parties form within each sector, attempting to alter particular rules in their favor. *Redistributive* policies involve actually

taking something from one group of people and giving it to another. This action usually mobilizes an elite and a counter-elite in the political arena to defend their essentially class interests, which are often expressed in an ideology.

Lowi's model, it should be stressed, was designed for American politics. It focuses on a formal governmental structure, it assumes rational political actors, and it is phrased mostly in terms of economic issues. Nevertheless, it does describe the kinds of coalitions that tend to form under certain configurations of interests; and it does not appear, in essence, to be limited to allocations by governments, culture-bound, or unable to handle the politics of coercion and prestige as well as the politics of wealth. Lowi has applied this model to foreign-policy decisions, arguing that policies in relation to the environment are perceived by political actors not so much in terms of their probable impact on the environment, but in terms of the domestic reallocation of resources that they entail. This is of particular interest in explaining why, under the appropriate circumstances, an organization might virtually ignore the real characteristics of its environment rather than adjusting to them.

Finally, as the final point in Dahl's program, we must consider variation in the probability that particular kinds of resources can be translated through particular strategies into particular *amounts* of control over particular aspects of behavior. This consideration strikes at a basic aspect of Nadel's definition of social structure: namely, that a society is made up of roles in which people's expectations are mutually stabilized. Such a concept cannot be the point of departure for a political analysis, since it takes as given what politics is all about, namely, the attempt to secure regularity in and reduce uncertainty about other people's behavior. The uncertainty of political outcomes is fundamental to the models of strategic choice through which a number of anthropologists have recently approached the subjects of social structure and social change (Barth 1966, 1967; Buchler and Selby 1968) because it adds to a decision-making analysis a consideration of the circumstances under which relatively risk-reducing and relatively risk-incurring strategies will be entertained.

To illustrate, let us consider three positions along a continuum of uncertainty in translating resources into power. This continuum ex-

plains nothing in itself, but, like "structural differentiation" and other very general notions in social science, it may help to identify in a clumsy way a range of variation that we would be ill-advised to ignore. Like any other gains and costs, political sanctions should be treated through formal analytical machinery for discounting future to present values and dealing with uncertainty. In other words, depending on its uncertainty and distance in time, a sanction will have to be either more or less drastic in order to produce the same amount of change in behavior. Moreover, if we are going to fit models of resources and power to real political behavior, it may be necessary to take into consideration the time horizon, discount rates, and risk-taking preferences of our political actors.

In highly regularized social situations, actors' expectations about each other have "shaken down," and the translation of resources into power proceeds on a predictable ratio at a predictable rate. The distinction between resources and power is not radical here, and both actors and analysts may take the one as an index of the other. The social system may be thought of as in a "solid state," with the movements of its components narrowly restricted. The system of social action is so highly structured that there are no opportunities for the creation of new power, and there is very little free-floating power to compete for because most power is "frozen in" to one part of the social structure or another. Most power is already invested in relatively low-risk, high-profit political projects; not only is there very little opportunity for new investment, there is very little incentive for it. Going concerns are virtually assured of survival and stability, and are not under pressure to increase the efficiency or effectiveness of their investments and incentive systems. Compliance is likely to be habitual, automatic, and even unconscious rather than newly calculated for each new event. This is the politics of preservation, stabilized by commitment to valued traditions or by the hegemony of dominant actors.

In partially regularized social situations, there is a more than minimal uncertainty about translating resources into power. Changes in the internal structure or external environment of the arena of power, or the innovation by particular actors of new tactics for using resources, make the distinction between resources and power signifi-

cant; but the distinction is not so radical as to preclude estimates of the probable success of particular exercises of power. The social system may be thought of as in a fluid state, with its components having more degrees of freedom and moving through greater distances. There are free-floating resources open to competition, and sufficient looseness in the system of social action that there is room for entrepreneurship and innovation in the accumulation and use of resources. Investors in this fluid situation have converted some of their power into liquid assets in order to take advantage of new or more favorable investment opportunities. Going concerns are likely to survive, but they must cope with instability and are under pressure to increase efficiency and effectiveness in their use of power. Compliance is conditional, calculated, and conscious on many matters. This is the politics of profit, of competition and bargaining among approximate equals for moderate and rationally calculable gains and costs, circumscribed by the rules of the game.

In highly irregular social situations, actors' expectations about each other have been thoroughly shaken up, and neither the intentions nor the capabilities of other actors are well understood. The distinction between resources and power is radical here, and neither actors nor analysts can more than guess at the outcome of particular clashes of resources. The social system may be thought of as a gas; its components have almost unlimited degrees of freedom and move unpredictably through great distances. The power in the system is indeterminate in shape and location, and subject to sudden expansions and contractions. Almost no power is firmly in the hands of any actors, and a new base of power must be put together to secure practically every new instance of compliance. Investors face a high-risk market with a very short time horizon; though preferring to limit themselves to short-term, high-profit investments they have no alternative but to commit themselves to chancy projects in order to survive. Going concerns are actively threatened with extinction, and must maximize efficiency and effectiveness as far as they can. This is the politics of survival, a psychological politics of bluff and deception between units of incommensurable power, with no holds barred.

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