CHAPTER 33
Globalization

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I shall argue that there are two challenges for Christianity from globalization. First, theology has long engaged with political thought in the West, especially in terms of Luther's "two kingdoms" theory. There is also the relationship of Christianity to the great nineteenth-century ideologies of socialism and neo-liberalism. However, the impact of globalization is such that there is little certainty any more about the future of politics (Lloyd 2001a). Once there were political theories of justice, which were rationalist, utilitarian, and dependent on classical theories of the citizen in the nation-state. In their place today comes a much greater reliance on ad hoc theories, which are pragmatic in a fast-changing world. For example, Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen speak of "multiple identities" as a basis for a theory of justice which can enable a response to poverty. Even if globalization as a phenomenon has been overinterpreted (Hay and Marsh 2000), such a philosophical shift is of great significance, and has led many political scientists to rethink much of their analysis of political life.

The second challenge is the practice of mission. Local churches in large cities are the future for much of Christianity across the world. As these become less and less Western in their understanding of authority, tradition, and beliefs, the practice of Christianity will become more diffuse and harder to fit within a conventional doctrinal framework. The issue of mission is central to the global future of Christianity. There has been a great deal of writing in contemporary theology on the future of mission, arising from the idea of "the church as counterculture" (Budde and Brimlow 2000). David Bosch, Murray Demster, and others have all highlighted the importance of urban mission, as have Laurie Green and Andrew Davey. Their writing is important because it mediates the praxis of non-Western, yet urban, Christianity into England. The challenge is to contextualize the practice of mission in a way that is sensitive to the local culture.

What is interesting is how the discussion of justice and multiple identities combines with reflection on mission. The theories of justice found in Nussbaum

and Sen are important because they generate in communities a vision of what is possible. Such a vision in turn has the power to create social change, and to prevent catastrophic poverty and famine. The agents in developing countries are local – often faith – communities. In the case of the churches, it is clear that the local Christian communities which Sen and Nussbaum see as fundamental are both engaging with theories of justice in a way very different from traditional political theories, and also seeking to practice new forms of mission. The tension is very creative: in the expanding global cities the crucial factor is to hold together both a mission strategy and a justice strategy. The fascinating question is whether the alliance of Christians with secular bodies against poverty is affected by the growth of local forms of Christianity: whether, in fact, the question of justice and identity is related to the issue of mission. In my view, the question of the understanding of mission and justice by local churches across the globe will introduce a new factor into the debate about the future of Christianity.

In other words, I think that the future of non-Western Christianity will be on the one hand a struggle, in alliance with secular bodies and environmental and feminist movements, against poverty and violence. On the other, it will be about the mission of local Christian groups ("churches") in predominantly urban areas. The alliance with secular bodies raises the complex philosophical issue of which theory of justice unites Christian groups with these bodies. The issue of mission and inculturation raises a different question: that of the identity of Christianity in the movement of the Spirit.

What is Meant by Speaking of Globalization?

It is no longer the view of international theorists that globalization is a single process. Rather, several changes have taken place. First, there is a return to the pre-1914 situation of global trade, capital mobility, and immigration. It is not exactly the same, but the trends point to a rough similarity. In particular the mobility of capital is now very great, as it was before 1914, but on a much vaster scale. Second, there is a series of processes, including flows of information, capital, etc., which exacerbate many local political, social, cultural, and economic tendencies to breaking point. These flows do not amount to a "global process" – globalization is not a demonic external force – but they do produce a crisis for political life in many regions of the world. Putting it another way, what has happened is that political forces in many societies have devalued the legitimacy of the modern state. Globalization has helped that, but the process was underway in any case. Much of the political legitimacy built up between 1945 and 1980 in non-Western nations that had gained political independence during these years was very fragile at best, and in Western democracies in this period the power of the state overreached itself. The secular ideologies of socialism were very strong in the period 1945–60: Ben Gurion in Israel built a secular,

Israeli state, with kibbutzim as the great vision of the future; there were similar commitments in India with Nehru, Nasser in Egypt, and Nyerere in Tanzania. Most of these saw little relevance in religion except as a private matter (Nyerere was an exception here). These political movements were overambitious and by 1990 were shattered, both economically and in terms of ideology. Third, there is an awareness that cultural patterns and flows now reach across the globe, even if again it is a mistake to speak of global culture. This spread is combined with enormous and desperate poverty for some people who live in the growing sprawl of cities across the developing world. However, here again there has been to my mind persuasive criticism by Hay and Marsh (2000) of the unwarranted determinism of a neo-Marxist reading of what is in fact contingent, local culture, even if it is affected by patterns which are replicated across the globe. There is no determinism in the development of nations, nor of their citizens.

Forms of Discourse about Globalization

Globalization has been discussed at length in the last decade, within academic, political, and business circles. It is hardly surprising that theologians, church members, and church leaders have also commented on it (Stackhouse and Paris 2000; Selby 1997). The churches are seen as the defenders of local culture, welfare states, and sustainable economics against the imperialism of global forces, harsh multinationals, and the trivializing of culture. However, within the secular debate there are distinct discourses, which have particular forms of dialogue.

Economists discuss the extent to which the market approximates to perfect competition, as in neoclassical theory, by the perfect, global mobility of goods, labor, and capital. Capital in turn can be created by both financial and social, or institutional, investment. A global market has been created by deregulation, financial liberalization, and the changes created by information and telecommunications technology. It is sometimes called a "technological revolution," although it should be noted that the time between a technological advance and its full implementation in business and society may be considerable.

In a similar, related, but nevertheless distinct area, political economists debate whether these economic processes contribute to the diminution of the power of the state. In one way it is clearly true. In my own quite short lifetime, the British government has ceased to ration mortgages through indirect controls on lending by financial companies, withdrawn to a large extent from its management of the export of capital, and ceded the setting of interest rates to the national Bank of England. Capital mobility and the power of the markets may weaken the authority of national governments in fiscal and monetary policy.

Sociologists have also argued about whether there is a global civil society, especially in the growing number of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). A similar debate occurs about the increased urbanization of our world, and how

far such cities share common features. Finally, cultural theorists, and urban theorists, seek to explain how vast (essentially trivializing) cultural forces may overwhelm tradition and local communities. Even before any theological reflection on these realities begins, it is worth noticing that this literature analyses flows of people and information. These flows might be of capital, people, culture, technology, or images. Such dynamic realities have different textures and shapes, and changing identities. Any response, including that of theology, must be complex and multidisciplinary. However, even this caution is not enough. An interdisciplinary approach might suggest either that there is one process of globalization, or that globalization is itself a discrete, identifiable process. Political scientists since the late 1990s have come to be critical of this way of describing globalization, as though it were a thing, or an irresistible force. Instead, it is better to envisage multiple global processes, interacting in contingent ways, which are unevenly developed in different places and times.

The reason for caution lies in the way in which, again and again, history gives examples of economic transformation coming to a stop and instead turning into a slow, inexorable process of decline, for a variety of cultural and political reasons (Landes 1998). The first example comes from the fact that the European economy, and especially that of Russia, went into reverse after 1914, initiating a series of protectionist economic policies, civil wars, and ultimately a total breakdown of economic relations, which finally created the global catastrophe of World War II. It took many years to recover from the catastrophe, so that only since the 1990s have politicians and academics begun to use the language of world trade and international relations common before 1914. A second example is that of fifteenth-century China, where the state controlled technical progress. The Ming dynasty (1368–1644) prohibited overseas trade for over a century. The country's lead, built up over several centuries, in the skills of ironmaking, printing, and other industries declined. Existing knowledge fell into disuse. Since there was no private enterprise to challenge the state, as happened in medieval Europe where the guilds supplanted the power of the monarchy and feudal aristocracy by means of civic political representation, China regressed for centuries in technology, economics, and eventually national and international political power (Coyle 2000). These examples show cogently, if proof were needed, that there is nothing inevitable about economic progress or cultural change.

The Myth of Economic Globalization

There has been a powerful academic debate about how to describe globalization. The debate began in the late 1980s, and has moved through two stages in a short time. The first began when politicians, and the media, discovered the reality of globalization. It was seen as a vast all-conquering monster, which would swallow up civil society, the welfare state, and the nation-state. Capital, culture, and communications would erase what had been accepted for decades, if not centuries,

and the "false dawn" (Gray 1998) of globalization would herald the destruction of much of our civilization. The response by many academics has been that this literature is crude and uncritical and generates a powerful mythology. They argue that the mythology of business globalization is not to be accepted at face value. From 1995 to 2000, a second wave of academic debate debunking globalization developed, which spelled out these reservations about the use of the term as a world-conquering fact of our times.

The economic arguments are complex, but can be summarized. First, it has been argued that high levels of social expenditure on the welfare state correlate positively (in regions such as Scandinavia) with competitive advantage in the world economy, so it is not true that globalization means the end of the welfare state. There is no reason to expect deeply rooted domestic institutions to be radically altered because they adversely affect the profitability of firms. This is particularly true of the welfare state, which remains extremely popular among most citizens of the OECD. Second, productive capital and foreign direct investment (FDI) are not as mobile as had been thought. Such movement occurs in certain cities and industries, primarily in the great trading blocs, although here too national boundaries remain important. Domestic producers, especially in the United States and Asia, still largely satisfy domestic demand. Indeed, FDI flows as a percentage of gross domestic product in many advanced industrial countries are no greater now than they were during the period 1900–14. Thus European financiers and industrialists, or their American and Asian counterparts, have done no more than return to the sort of economy common before World War I, with foreign imports, exports, and capital investments again becoming a central part of the economy. The two differences are the much smaller role that migration plays now, compared with the beginning of the twentieth century, and the far greater role of international financial speculation today. The final factor is that productive capital continues to be highly aware of national economic regulation, as it always has been, even given the withdrawal of the state from many areas of economic life.

The counter-argument spells out the falsity of the first-wave argument in the economic debate about globalization. Indeed, many commentators point to the patterns of trade before 1914 as a much more integrated global system, where labor was free to move around the globe, bringing millions through Ellis Island off New York as immigrants to the New World. Keynes, in a well-known passage, reflects on the ease of travel and investment of capital, and the speed of communications, in the period 1900–14. While globalization is a reality, it is also far less of a new phenomenon than we might think.

The Fallacy of Urban Globalization

Similar cautions exist in the field of urban theory. For example, Smith (2001) claims that neo-Marxism always reduces culture to "deeper political-economic

determinism." Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen make the same criticism. Universalism is conflated with progressive rationality. The general public is assumed to be passive in the face of "the sea change in cultural production ushered in by aesthetic and cultural elites" (Smith 2001: 46). The vibrancy of migrant social networks is not recognized by Marxism, since it argues that capital has commodified culture. Cultural and religious movements, not based on class, are dismissed as local, partial, and ineffective. Smith lays emphasis on local, social movements, which hold to a politics based on ethnicity, rather on local, social movements, which hold to a politics based on ethnicity, religion, sexuality, environmental issues, and gender. These are "the myriad transnational practices of politics and culture that now criss-cross the landscape of transnational cities throughout the world, inexorably irrigating their politics and social life" (p. 188). Such cultural forces have been well charted by Castells (1997), Bauman (1998), and Sassen (2000). They are also the context for urban mission. We shall return to this point in the next section.

Mission as the Dialogue of Theology and Globalization

The relevance of such a theoretical discussion of globalization to theology is that there are new, and increasing, challenges to the accepted place of the existing churches and faith communities within society and to existing cultures, social traditions, and values. Theology's task is to discern what the implications of these changes are for the identity of the Gospel wherever these challenges arise, and what it means to be the church.

Pentecostalism makes an interesting case-study. The response of pentecostalism to the changes brought about by the experience of globalization in East Asia and Latin America illustrates how much it has been forced into a re-examination of its beliefs by the economic and social changes occurring in these continents. Much pentecostalism has emerged from contexts of economic poverty and social marginalization

> The pentecostal churches' experience of the Gospel in the midst of economic poverty is a key gift to the global church. It has empowered individuals and families who address their economic poverty through the transformation of their personal and family life. It needs to develop a spirituality that is capable of equipping people to address larger cultural and socio-political issues. (Samuel 1999)

There are signs that this is beginning to happen. Ronald Bueno (1999) says that the shifting landscape of persons which he studies as an anthropologist and as a pentecostalist is made up of "immigrants, refugees, exiles, guest-workers and other moving groups and persons." He suggests that the experience of unequal power shapes pentecostalism deeply. Pentecostalism illustrates one Christian response to the challenge posed by globalization to existing societies and their values.

Others are very critical of the silence of pentecostalism in East Asia in the face of huge economic problems. The explosive growth of pentecostalist churches has been achieved at the expense of tackling social and economic oppression. Yet even here there are now programs for drug addicts and alienated urban youth in pentecostalist Korean and Philippine churches (Jungja Ma 1999). Whichever view is correct, it is evident that mission and ecclesial identity are deeply affected by the rapidity of social and cultural change.

One of the critical issues is the ecclesial identity of mission-oriented churches, whether pentecostalist or not. The new ecclesiology of the poor in Latin America "reflects the culture, daily life and deep-seated longing for justice" (Cadorette 2000). Cadorette argues that justice is not a vision which the institutional church has often pursued. He claims that the institutional nature of Roman Catholicism is in sharp contrast to the nature of popular Christianity in Latin America. There is above all the issue of leadership and authority. The community, not the clergy, is the primary bearer of mission. The old distinction between the teaching and the learning church will take a long time to be expunged, but nevertheless the clergy are only one part of the life of the community. What is needed is a theology of the laity, who are active in the local community (Bosch 1996).

The previous paragraphs have described the engagement of pentecostalism with mission. Another response to globalization has been the commitment of the churches in the affluent West to reform the international economy. To this response I now turn.

The Struggle for Justice

There is a close link between violence and poverty. It is striking that in a survey of armed conflicts across the globe in 2001, the (London) *Financial Times* argued that 25 of the 27 wars currently taking place were civil wars. Civil war does not automatically correlate with religious or ethnic division, or with economic inequality within a country, but with severe deprivation. Warlords in intensely poor African countries are able to finance their civil wars by the export of, for instance, diamonds or oil. Asian and South American insurgents export the raw materials for drugs and finance insurrections with the wealth from these exports. Western churches have begun to initiate a dialogue with their own governments on this issue, at the same time as churches, and other faith communities, have fought to end the burden of debt repayment, especially through the Jubilee 2000 campaign. Rightly, churches have seen the burden of debt as a great moral evil which stunts human life, and which must be removed as soon as possible. There has been a greater reluctance for some local churches to address the problem of civil wars, and corrupt governments or warlords (for a positive view see Shriver 2000).

Churches played a major role in the struggle against apartheid in South Africa, and in Central America against right-wing dictatorships in the 1970s and 1980s. However, the local church has not found it easy to take a stand in the present violence in Zimbabwe and Zaire. The fact that some Anglican bishops in Zimbabwe support President Mugabe illustrates the problem. Much of the violence centers on poverty (e.g. the control of minerals in Zaire) and the abuse of power. The control of raw materials confers power, and access to wealth, in a situation of deprivation and poverty, and enables exploitation and violence to take place.

Churches have increasingly wrestled with the issues of fair trade and global debt. Governing the world economy has become one of the central issues for both campaigners and policy-makers. "The world economy cannot be milked for the benefit of a tiny minority for long without generating unsustainable crisis and conflict" (Coyle 2000). Markets require strong regulation within an institutional and legal framework. Financial instability can overwhelm small, open economies, such as are often found in Asia or South America. There is an incompatibility, perhaps even an "unholy trinity" in developing nations of currency stability, capital mobility, and national monetary autonomy. However, it is not simply market instability that is the problem. There is also the issue of the monopoly power of large corporations, which can control access to new technology by governments of poor nations, and apply lower standards of corporate responsibility in poorer countries.

Free markets can be defended as a way of opening up the interests of the majority of the population against elites wishing to protect their inherited values and interests. The example of the Ming dynasty is a powerful one at this point (Sen 1999b). It is also the case that free markets diffuse their benefits widely, whereas the benefits of restrictions are often concentrated in vested interests. What free markets create is not disorder, but a new form of social order. Jubilee 2000 shows that long-term changes can be won by an effective coalition, however hard the campaign may be. There is a great need to allow the balance of trade to shift to the advantage of the developing countries. Equally important is the need to continue to expose exploitative practices in the third world by means of the world media, consumer campaigns, and eventual international cooperation to raise the incomes of those who work in the industries of developing nations. There are certainly encouraging signs of progress, which is not always the picture that is presented. For example, "the adult literacy rate for the developing countries rose from 43% in 1970 to 64% in 1994" (Hicks 2000). Life expectancy has also risen over the last few decades. If economic change could be achieved by the reduction of the debt owed by many nations, much energy might be released. Poverty and debt act as severe constraints on the ability to bring about the slow transformation of a society to fulfill all the capabilities of its citizens.

Philosophical Considerations

So far we have examined mission and the struggle for justice. It is time to relate these concerns to philosophical considerations about justice. The American

philosopher Martha Nussbaum asks how religion relates to justice. What happens when there is a conflict between religion and liberty, as has happened in India and other non-Western nations? There arises a dilemma for the liberal state. Interfering with the freedom of religious expression is a damaging attack on one of the basic capabilities of humanity. Yet such religious practice may coerce some people, especially women. Child marriage, harsh divorce settlements, and other practices may infringe human capabilities. Secular feminists do not see the problem, since for them the values of women's equality and dignity outweigh all religious claims. Religion may be seen in Marxist terms, and therefore as patriarchal. Others portray it in liberal terms, and therefore believe that its content can be translated into moral values. A third, feminist, position reverses the valuation: core, traditional values of a community oppose the acids of modernity; being a traditional Muslim, Christian, or Hindu is on this view an affirmation of human dignity. Some such arguments stem from cultural relativism, where it is held that crosscultural moral norms are by definition impossible of justification. Others, especially in the Christian evangelical movement, think local values and tradition are a better way to lead one's life, since they spring from an organic understanding of what it means to be a person in that place and time. The conflict between religion and liberalism arises from a lack of agreement as to how the changes brought by globalization are to be met.

One way of resolving the argument between religion and liberalism is from the notion of capabilities. In *Women and Human Development* (2000), Nussbaum argues on the basis of a concept of the capabilities of human beings, which can command a broad cultural consensus. Consequently, this is a notion which can be endorsed for political purposes. It serves as the moral basis for constitutional guarantees endorsed by people who do not agree on what a complete good life for a human being would be. These central capabilities have value in themselves, and are not just instrumental in making possible further actions. Nussbaum argues for ten such "central human functional capabilities": life; bodily health; bodily integrity, including absence of domestic violence, absence of sexual abuse, and choice in reproduction; sense, imagination, and thought, which covers religious practice, freedom of expression, and the use of literacy and numeracy; emotions, which refers to not having one's emotions blunted by trauma, fear, or anxiety; liberty of conscience and the ability to form a conception of the good life by practical reason; affiliation, social interaction, and having the social basis of self-respect and nonhumiliation, which entails the absence of discrimination on the basis of race, religion, sexual orientation, caste, or place of origin; expressing concern for other species, and the world of nature; play and laughter; and control over one's environment, both political and material.

Such a list, argues Nussbaum, is how we come to conceive of what justice might be. Some of her list is made up of "natural goods," where the vagaries of life and the sheer presence of luck play a part. Health and emotional balance are at least in part based on natural attributes, but governments can aim to deliver the social basis of these capabilities. Nussbaum argues, for instance, that a government cannot determine the emotional health of a woman, but governments can implement laws on violence, rape, and family relationships. They can also determine whether a nation is at peace internally, by preventing civil wars.

Why should one opt for capabilities and not functioning? Capabilities allow for human choice, so a person who chooses to fast may do so, and a person who wishes to be celibate may be so. There is no one global world, or global process, but a myriad of local cultures, traditions, and values. It is important that choices are respected. Such a view means that human rights become "capability rights." If a person in theory has freedom of political participation, but in practice has none, then there must be doubts about its meaningfulness. "Women in many nations have a nominal right of political participation without having this right in the sense of capability; for example, they may be threatened with violence should they leave the home. In short, thinking in terms of capability gives us a benchmark as we think about what it is to secure a right to someone" (Nussbaum 2000: 98).

The dilemma between religion and human rights is made sharper because of a decline in political power, one of the ways in which in many countries globalization has impinged on the nation-state. This is a difficult problem, since religion can play a role in promoting moral conduct, though Nussbaum repeats that she is not adopting a liberal understanding of religion, which reduces religion to rational accounts of moral choice. The resolution of the issue by Nussbaum is not my concern here. What matters is that she recognizes that it is a dilemma, in which religion can have a central role to play.

Amartya Sen puts the issue in a different way. He is concerned with the relationship of justice and political institutions. He argues that when Rawls's *A Theory of Justice* postulates an account of justice as fairness this leads him to a difficulty. If universal justice, drawing on classical utilitarianism and Kantian rationality, is to be related to political institutions, where are such universal institutions, capable of implementing these rules of justice? They manifestly do not exist. Rawls therefore opts to set his theory within individual political societies, in which institutions can develop and so bear the weight of implementing his theory. However, he cannot let go of a universal vision and in the 1996 revision of *A Theory of Justice* he speaks of nation-states and other collectivities having relations based on justice. Is not Rawls restricting his theory of justice too much? Rawls postulates two places where justice can be found: within the nation-state, and between states and societies. This move brings him into potential conflict with an alternative view of solidarities based on transnational collectivities. Sen's essay was written before the publication of Nussbaum's appeal to feminist solidarity across the world, but it is clear that Sen has this option in mind, along with professional obligations arising from membership of a profession, or worker's solidarity. Sen argues, in a way similar to Nussbaum, that the future of justice in a global world demands the consideration of "multiple identities." Individuals may have different identities (female, Christian, citizen, member of an NGO, etc.).

He sums up his argument as follows: "The exercise of assessing the relative strength of divergent demands arising from competing affiliations is not trivial,

but to deny our multiple identities and affiliations just to avoid having to face this problem is neither intellectually satisfactory nor adequate for practical policy (Sen 1999b)." Sen refuses to let the concept of person as citizen be the trump card in much the same way as Nussbaum rejects the subordination of religion to secular values. Global public goods include codes of business ethics which keep corruption in check, generate rules of conduct, and foster healthy relationships with customers and other businesses. The implication for churches is that they need to be aware of the power of multiple identities.

Multiple identities raise the question of ecclesial identity, and so we are once again faced with the issue of mission. A local church will see its identity as to do with faithfulness to the Gospel, holding on to its apostolicity. "When the Church seeks to be truly apostolic it must drive forward . . . we are moulded by and carry the story which we seek to make fresh in every generation" (Green 2001). Urban mission means simultaneously acknowledging the identities of individuals as immigrants, only a few years in their new country, and yet also enabling them to feel empowered by the presence of the Spirit. How mission is contextualized becomes important.

Theological Conclusion

In the global reality of social and political change the secular, left-wing ideologies of the post-1945 era have withered and died in virtually every nation that received its independence from European empires in those years. In their place have come a series of cultural and social changes, sometimes described as flows. The modern city is not a secular, planned, and socialist settlement but a chaotic growth of ethnic, religious, and cultural migrants. Davey is critical of Castells for failing to give due weight to the vibrancy of religion in the modern city (Davey 2001). Many migrants in pentecostal and other churches have a deep commitment to mission. At the same time there is an exploration of new patterns of worship, authority, and dialogue with other faiths. It is not always a comfortable agenda for Western Christians, and the emphasis on the supernatural can be disturbing. However, there is also a constant struggle for economic and social justice, with the need to build alliances between churches and secular bodies.

At the same time the reformulation of political theory into a more pragmatic approach requires an account which can justify alliances between churches and governments. The key issue here is how NGOs and faith communities can listen to one another without each losing its integrity. Liberation theology in Latin America can be reformulated into a capability approach, deeply indebted to Sen. Such socioeconomic factors provide minimum requirements for personhood. Thus, while one should not overlook other spheres of life, there is justification for particular attention to socioeconomic goods in discussion of an equality of basic capability (Hicks 2000). If one moves back to England, then it is clear that churches will survive in urban areas only if they create partnerships with

secular agencies, thus raising again Sen's account of multiple identities and persons belonging to different agencies, all concerned with justice (Atherton 2000). How Christian communities can contribute to the formulation and enforcement of democratic contracts by alliance with secular bodies and NGOs is a constant refrain in this argument. Nussbaum shows, as does South African Joyce Seroke (2000), that religion cannot be regarded simply as a hindrance in achieving a secular, democratic society. What is needed is an alliance between religious bodies, political groups, and NGOs to develop human capabilities in a way that removes obstacles to their expression. In particular, Nussbaum's combination of classical philosophy and an attention to the needs of women is an innovating approach that allows local religious traditions to contribute to the enhancement of human capabilities. Sen equally argues that a theory of justice, which responds to poverty, cannot simply be universalist in the utilitarian or Kantian traditions, but must be fashioned out of local identities.

The global world of the twenty-first century is beginning to take shape. The most appropriate political theology is local, contextual, and found in the cities of the developing world. It will be made up of the interaction of theological and philosophical discourses. Christian communities are caught up in the massive changes created by technology and capitalism. They need to link their commitment to mission to awareness that oppression can be challenged. There are signs that this is beginning to happen. At the same time the philosophical approach pioneered by Sen and Nussbaum needs to be taken further. Churches are as much involved with the nurturing of human capabilities as any other agency.

The solidarities which support justice-making in the global cities of the future draw on ecclesiologies of complex, multiple identities. That is the most important point to make at the end of this essay. Many writers have overemphasized globalization as a force, and the reality is far more subtle and complex than is often allowed for. Nevertheless, the search for such identities will be the crucial task of this century. Churches can often be too accepting of the cultural and national relations in which they are set. They become too easily prisoners of their own culture (Williams 2000). The task which faces churches in many of the new, dynamic cities of the globe allows no such easy resolution of the issue.

There are two challenges for Christianity. One is the change in political thought, which is a shift to pragmatic, ad hoc theories of "what works," allowing no room for theories of human nature, but only appeals to the skills of technical experts in a particular area. This can isolate Christianity as, in the view of its critics, a religion which is insufficiently pragmatic, and too bound up with theories of justice which are dependent on past understandings of the relationship of citizen and nation-state. The second challenge is about the redefinition of mission, in terms of its contextualization. This article has resisted strongly the idea that globalization is a single, unitary process. Instead, there are a series of changes interacting with these challenges to Christianity. There is rapid urbanization across the globe alongside a decline in the power of nation-states to plan in the manner espoused by Western socialists after 1945. In these chaotic, fast-growing cities churches and other faith groups seek to evangelize, but they are

repeatedly challenged as to their identity as the cultural identity of their city itself changes. They are also caught up in the struggle for justice. I have suggested that Nussbaum and Sen offer a way through this confused situation with their two key ideas. One is that of capabilities, whereby the struggle for justice allows for capabilities to be developed, without prescribing how these capabilities will be used. This means that there does not have to be a tight definition of what it means to be a person, but rather only an agreement as to what is necessary if one is to achieve one's personal identity, whatever that might be. In this way pluralism is built into the debate. The second idea is that of multiple identities, which again means that a theory of justice can be many sided. Both these ideas relate to the complex reality of the struggle to survive, and be a person, in the modern city.

Finally, global capitalism needs to be reformed. Hicks (2000) puts the point well: If the debt of many nations could be written off, much good would be achieved. The complexity of globalization stems from its reality as a series of local flows of information, capital, and human beings, which place many local cultures under a pressure to change that leads to breaking point. Only 50 years ago political theorists thought of the power of the state as being harnessed to produce a new society: planned economies interconnecting with social development. This was a worthy vision, but it is now dead. In its place is the energy of the global market, which churches struggle to contain so that it does not create yet more victims in its path. At the same time this energy is a challenge to the churches to find again the dynamic of the Gospel, which can speak through the challenges of globalization.

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PART V
Perspectives