

“LOVE YOUR ENEMIES”: USURY, CITIZENSHIP AND THE FRIEND-ENEMY DISTINCTION

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Introduction

A central feature of debates in contemporary political theology is the nature of sovereignty and the need to counter overly monistic and monopolistic formations of power. Carl Schmitt's conception of the friend-enemy distinction as defining the political as such—and the relationship between this distinction and his conception of sovereignty—are key components in this debate. However, within these debates little attention is given to the relationship between political sovereignty and economic power (and in particular the power of money). A theological analysis of usury in Scripture helps address these lacunae as the distinction between who it is and who it is not licit to enter into usurious relations with turns out to be a paradigmatic instance of the friend-enemy distinction. An analysis of usury in Scripture and the reception of the Scriptural treatment of usury opens out a related debate in political theology about the nature of universalism, a debate which is largely a response to Schmitt's work. Central to this response is an engagement with Scripture and in particular the theo-political vision of St Paul. In this debate the work of Giorgio Agamben, Alain Badiou and Jacob Taubes is key. Alongside the influence of their philosophical engagement with Scripture, there is a growing emphasis on the theological interpretation of Scripture in both systematic theology and political theology.¹ This article seeks to take account of these developments in order to suggest that through an analysis of the scriptural treatment of usury a constructive, theological analysis of the question of the friend-enemy distinction as a political category, its

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relationship to a Christian conception of universalism as determined by being in Christ, and the nature of faithful citizenship can be forged.

The article begins by clarifying what Schmitt means by the friend-enemy distinction and how he defines the political. It then sets out how Schmitt makes sense of the friend-enemy distinction in Scripture and in particular Jesus' admonition to love your enemies. Having established what is meant by the friend-enemy distinction, I argue that usury is a paradigmatic instance of that distinction. Contrary to its treatment as an issue for consideration within economic history, I contend the question of whether usury is licit or not is a political rather than solely economic one. The assertion of usury's political character is justified through locating it within a wider account of debt in salvation history and the observation that freedom from debt slavery is a leitmotif and archetypal analogy in the theological conceptualisation of redemption. The texts in Scripture specifically about usury are part of a wider envisioning of a covenantal order that bears witness to God's redemption of Israel. Within such an order lending at interest, and the debt slavery that ensues, represents the rupturing of the covenantal obligations to God and neighbour that constitute the holiness of Israel and the basis of its faithful witness. The relationship between land, debt and the ability to participate in the body politic is central to understanding why usury represents such a threat to the faithful fulfilment of covenantal relations. To explicate this further a historical analogy is drawn with ancient Athens and how Aristotle conceptualises the relationship between debt and citizenship. In both ancient Athens and ancient Israel political participation is a form of *koinonia* or public friendship that usury threatens to dissolve. The conceptualisation of citizenship as a form of *koinonia* is then contrasted with the development of modern understandings of citizenship from Hobbes onwards wherein debt ceases to be a threat to active citizenship but a condition of it.

A full treatment of usury in Scripture necessitates a theological reading of the Deuteronomic double standard and the Scriptural commendation of usurious relations with enemies. I argue that rather than rationalise the double standard in order to dissolve the seeming contradiction, the double standard articulates the ambiguity of charging interest, which, like a drug, is simultaneously both a poison and a remedy. Following the precedent of Ambrose, I suggest that usury is best understood as a form of non-violent warfare undertaken in conditions of exile or where there is a massive asymmetry of power between Israel and its enemies. The article closes by returning to Schmitt's reading of Jesus' commandment to love enemies. While agreeing with Schmitt's critique of liberalism's claim to overcome and supersede the political through a rationalistically derived universalism, I contend that against his interpretation of Jesus' command, the friend-enemy distinction is relativised so that while it is not overcome, after Christ, it ceases to be political and becomes missiological instead. The implication of this missiological location of the friend-enemy distinction is directly related to the on-going question of

usury. The charging of interest ceases to be an existential question and becomes a penultimate one instead. Theologically this opens the space for a distinction between usury as a form of coercive power that falsely claims a political relation and the licit charging of interest as a primarily economic relation in instances where reciprocity and mutual interest are upheld. This theological distinction allows for a re-evaluation of the historical development of Scholastic and Reformation treatments of usury, not as a story of decline and fall, as many contend, but a properly theological development in the light of the changed status of usury after Christ.

The Friend-Enemy Distinction in Schmitt

Carl Schmitt conceives of the political as such as determined by the friend-enemy antithesis. It is important to clarify what he means by this. If one is to judge a particular situation as pertaining to the political as against some other sphere of judgement, such as the moral or aesthetic, then the specific criterion for a political judgement as against aesthetic, economic or moral judgements is whether a particular relation constitutes a friend or an enemy, not of an individual but of an association or people. Other antitheses such as whether something is ugly or beautiful, profitable or unprofitable, moral or immoral are distinct from the criteria of political judgement. As Schmitt puts it:

The political enemy need not be morally evil or aesthetically ugly; he need not appear as an economic competitor, and it may even be advantageous to engage with him in business transactions. But he is, nevertheless, the other, the stranger; and it is sufficient for his nature that he is, in a specifically intense way, existentially something different and alien, so that in the extreme case conflicts with him are possible.²

Otherness for Schmitt represents a latent threat to one's own way of life because it represents a form of life that can replace or supersede one's own. This threat becomes operative when the other becomes an adversary who "intends to negate his opponent's way of life and therefore must be repulsed or fought in order to preserve one's own form of existence."³ Paradoxically, Schmitt's account does not entail incommensurability between conflicting forms of life. In contrast to Alasdair MacIntyre's account of incommensurability between rival traditions, for Schmitt, one has the ability to judge the other as ugly or immoral and to recognise them as a threat to one's own existence, which implies the possibility of common, rationally shared criteria of evaluation. Thus, for Schmitt, while political conflict is inherent between humans there is at the same time a universal human society of which all are members. However, we can only come to this universality dialectically through conflictual encounter with others. This helps explain Schmitt's insistence that while they represent a threat the other/enemy should not be demonised, treated as evil or rendered as sub-human and so outside the

human community.⁴ The distinction between political and moral judgement could be seen as Manichean, yet it appears to be a measure to ensure the moral status of the other while also recognising the existential nature of the conflict between different forms of life.⁵

For Schmitt part of the problem with liberalism is its refusal to admit the reality of enemies. For Schmitt liberalism subsumes enemies to another category entirely such as making the enemy an economic competitor or a debating adversary and thereby denying the existence of the political.⁶ The attempt to replace political with moral or economic categories leads to what Schmitt calls the depoliticisation of public life.⁷ Moreover, the refusal to take seriously the friend-enemy distinction results in widespread conceptual confusion. For Schmitt, words like state, republic, class and sovereignty only make sense when one knows "who is to be affected, combated, refuted, or negated by such a term."⁸ Or as he puts it most sharply: "The enemy is he who defines me."⁹

Schmitt is absolutely clear that war and the possibility of physically killing the other are central to the concept of the enemy. This does not mean that the political necessitates military action. And war is not politics by other means; rather, it has its own autonomy and purpose. Indeed, as Schmitt puts it: "The definition of the political suggested here neither favours war nor militarism, neither imperialism nor pacifism."¹⁰ But it does demand the recognition of the existential nature of the conflict between a friend and an enemy. War is not the aim or purpose of politics but it is an inherent possibility given in the nature of truly political relationships, as Schmitt conceives them. For Schmitt, even though it is the exception rather than the norm, war makes explicit the decisive meaning of politics. Other antitheses, whether economic, moral, or religious, become political where they form a grouping that is prepared to wage war on another group.

Schmitt uses his distinction to give a startling interpretation of Christ's admonition to "love your enemies." He states:

The often quoted "Love your enemies" (Matt. 5:44; Luke 6:27) reads "*diligite inimicos vestros,*" . . . , and not *diligite hostes vestros*. No mention is made of the political enemy. . . . The enemy in the political sense need not be hated personally, and in the private sphere only does it make sense to love one's enemy, i.e., one's adversary. The Bible quotation touches the political antithesis even less than it intends to dissolve, for example, the antithesis of good and evil or beautiful and ugly. It certainly does not mean that one should love and support the enemies of one's own people.¹¹

I contend that an analysis of usury in Scripture and its subsequent treatment in the Christian tradition simultaneously affirms and reconfigures Schmitt's interpretation of the command to love your enemies. Using Schmitt's conception of the political we can begin to make sense of the Scriptural treatment

of usury as a political act, one that treats the poor within or the foreigner without as an enemy. As will be seen, as a political act it is one that can constitute a form of warfare. It is precisely this dynamic that Schmitt himself seems to identify at the end of *The Concept of the Political* where he treats the relationship between liberalism, capitalism and humanitarianism. However, contrary to Schmitt, I contend that this is not a distinctively modern but a perennial dynamic that complexifies Schmitt's own conception of sovereignty.

Usury in Scripture

Usury is a political act. We need to be clear on this otherwise we fail to understand what is at stake in the treatment of usury in Scripture. However, before discussing the specific relationship between the Scriptural treatment of usury and the friend-enemy distinction it is necessary to establish the wider canonical context for such a discussion. This entails locating usury within an account of salvation history. A primary narrative template for understanding salvation is given in the book of Exodus. The central dramatic act of this story is liberation from debt slavery in Egypt. The canonical structure of Genesis and Exodus in the ordering of Scripture makes this point. The book of Genesis closes with the story of Joseph. At the end of this story, although saved from famine, the Israelites, along with everyone else in Egypt, are reduced to debt slavery.¹² This is a "voluntary" process entered into in order to receive the grain from Pharaoh's stores that the people had given to Pharaoh for safe keeping in the first place.¹³ After several rounds of expropriation the people finally come before Joseph and say: "There is nothing left in the sight of my lord but our bodies and our lands. . . . Buy us and our land in exchange for food. We with our land will become slaves to Pharaoh."¹⁴ The first chapter of Exodus opens with a new Pharaoh who takes advantage of the Israelites' debt slavery to exploit them. So the Israelites were not prisoners of war or chattel slaves; they were debt slaves undertaking *corvée* labour on behalf of the ruling elite.¹⁵ It is this condition from which that the Israelites are redeemed. As David Baker notes, the verb "go" in ancient Hebrew is used for both the exodus and for the seventh-year release of debt slaves.¹⁶ The linkage between liberation from Egypt and debt slavery is made explicit in Leviticus 25:35–46. In this text the prohibitions against usury and limits placed on debt slavery through the institution of jubilee are grounded in the relationship established between God and the people through the act of liberation from Egypt.

In the Gospels, Exodus is one of the key framing narratives that shape the presentation of Jesus' life, death and resurrection. And the notion of redemption or Jesus paying with his life in order to liberate humans from our debt of sin is a *leitmotif* in the New Testament (Mark 10:45; Romans 6:21–23; Colossians 3:5–6). Indeed, the declaration of Jubilee—that is, the release from debt

slavery—forms the basis of how Luke frames Jesus' announcement of his purpose and mission (Luke 4:18–19).¹⁷ And what Luke then depicts in Act 2 as a direct fruit of the outpouring of the Holy Spirit is the enactment of the Jubilee community where no one has debts, because "All who believed were together and had all things in common; they would sell their possessions and goods and distribute the proceeds to all, as any had need" (Acts 2:44–45).

At heart of the salvation narratives in both Old and New Testaments we find the power of money and liberation from debt is a central concern. The admonition that we cannot serve both God and Mammon (Matt. 6:19–24) is not a trivial matter: the central drama of salvation history is an act of liberation from debt slavery.¹⁸ To put the pursuit of money before the welfare of people, and use money to re-enslave and exploit people, especially the poor and vulnerable, is to turn your back on God's salvation and deny in practice the revelation given in Scripture of who God is. On the other hand, to use money to serve the common good, and in particular to relieve the poor, is a mark of salvation. Here the parables of Dives and Lazarus (Luke 16:19–31) and of the Rich Fool (Luke 12:16–20) are instructive. In these parables the wealthy who hoard their riches, using them for their own aggrandisement and benefit instead of giving and lending to others in need, are condemned not only as foolish but as damned.¹⁹

This brings us to the specific teaching on when and how we should lend each other money. Indicative of the direct teaching on lending money is the following from Exodus 22:25: "If you lend money to my people, to the poor among you, you shall not deal with them as a creditor; you shall not exact interest (*neshek*) from them."²⁰ As is set out in Psalm 15, not lending at interest is directly equated with righteousness.²¹ The Hebrew word used in Exodus and Psalm 15 is *neshek*, which is probably derived from the proto-semitic root of *ntk* or *nsk* meaning "bite."²² In the Old Testament, at least, usury can be used as a synonym for charging any kind of interest and is condemned as immoral in relation to those subject to covenantal obligations. The Patristic conceptualisation of usury seems to be consistent with this, as is early Rabbinic Judaism.²³ If anything, as Jacob Neusner argues, the Mishnah inflates the prohibition on charging interest to equate it with all forms of non-barter based, monetary economic transactions that resulted in a profit.²⁴

From the twelfth century onwards in both the Christian and the Jewish tradition there emerge distinctions between the legitimate charges on loans and usury, that is, the act or intention of taking profit on a loan.²⁵ There is a wide-ranging and complex historical debate about how usury as a term evolves and changes throughout the medieval period.²⁶ Key developments include the emergence of banking, processes of urbanization from the twelfth century onwards and what Noonan identifies as the religiously motivated attempt "to frame the intellectual and moral conditions under which credit might justly be extended."²⁷ One point that is little commented upon is the change of context from the Patristic to the early medieval period where both

the early church and the early rabbinic tradition were operating in a context where Roman law permitted certain forms of charging interest but capped interest rates. Thus John Chrysostom urges his congregation to go beyond what the civil law allows and express true Christian love when lending money.²⁸ Within the context of late antiquity, the prohibition on usury operated at the level of an intra-Christian or intra-Jewish exhortation for the proper treatment of brothers and sisters in the faith. The exhortations by ecclesial authorities against usury continued. However, following canon 17 in the Council of Nicea, up to the twelfth century, most of the injunctions against usury are directed solely at the clergy and those in holy orders. As Noonan notes, while Charlemagne forbade lending at usury for laity, "Strong sanctions are laid only against clerical usurers."²⁹ This reflected the broader development of divisions between clergy and laity in the formation of Christendom and the shifting conceptualization of who constituted the church militant. However, usury did come to be seen as a direct threat to Christian society as a whole. For example, the Council of Vienna (1311) declared that anyone who said or believed that usury was not a sin was to be punished as a heretic. Diane Wood observes that usury was taken to be directly analogous to heresy: it was seen to threaten the corporate unity of the church and was likened to a disease that could destroy the whole body if left unchecked.³⁰ Yet, at the same time, from the twelfth century onwards, exceptions to the absolute prohibition on usury emerge. Crucially, however, the common thread in all the concessions was the continuing subordination of economic to social relations and the distinction between legitimate profit and selfish gain.³¹ Where mutual reciprocity could be maintained, as in the sharing of risk, then a profit could be made. As Noonan concludes:

On charity and brotherhood there is no significant development reflected in eight hundred years of Scholastic opinion. . . . Usury theory is modified, but it is modified in response to changes in economic conditions or as a result of more thorough investigation of the rational demands of justice. Its modification reflects no trans-evaluation of values and no attenuation in love.³²

Usury theory, along with notions of a just price, was a way of conceptualising the embeddedness of market relations within wider and prior moral and legal relationships.

In the Old Testament, to profit from a loan to a fellow Israelite with whom one has a kinship relation is to make God an enemy. God is for the Israelites and has a particular concern for the poor and vulnerable among his people. To engage in usury is not only to have no fear of God but also to oppose oneself to God through treating God's elect as an enemy: that is, to act as one whose manner and way of living is directly opposed to and a threat to God's covenantal ordering of life. This political action against God and his people can only result in death to the usurer (Ezek. 18:10–13). Locating oneself as an

enemy of God and his people is not exclusive to the sin of usury. Bribery, theft, adultery and other sins equally place one in opposition to God's order. However, the proper ordering of lending and borrowing and their effects on the right ordering of communal relations is at least of equal if not greater concern in the various legislative codes. This is because the proper relationship between the land and the people is at stake.³³ The land and fellow Israelites were non-fungible goods given by God as gifts for the flourishing of all. Possession of land did not entitle the holder to exclusive use; rather it was a nonexclusive usufruct. Human ownership and use of created goods was limited because God is the ultimate owner; humans are simply stewards of what they have received from God.³⁴ To convert land or people into fungible goods of no greater value than anything else is not only to instrumentalise them for one's own benefit, and so place one's own welfare above the good of all, but to usurp God's title. In modern parlance we call such a process "commodification": the treating of that which is not for sale as a commodity to be bought and sold. The extensive manumission laws of Exodus, Deuteronomy and Leviticus relate to debt slavery and are measures to keep in check such a process of commodification of land and people.³⁵ For example, in Leviticus, the Israelite who cannot pay back his loan cannot be made a debt-slave but remains free, and instead becomes a hireling of the creditor until he can amortize his debt.³⁶

Treatment of the poor is a touchstone that marks whether relations of faithful, mutual responsibility that encompass the whole people are adhered to or not. The turning of people and land into property capable of being traded within a monetary economy is a direct threat to the proper ordering of economic, social and political relations and the concrete ability of all the people to participate in the covenantal order as those of equal value. The key issue at stake here is not usury per se (as will be seen, there is no absolute prohibition on usury in Scripture) but the nature of the relationship between the lender and the borrower as fellow members of the people of God. Both land and people belonged to God and were not to be expropriated for personal gain or monetised as commodities to be bought and sold. The Jubilee legislation (whether historically enacted or not) serves as a limit that disrupts any justification to permanently expropriate land through debt.³⁷ The land was to be used to provide the means of life, not converted through exploitation or monopolisation into a means for either the death or the enslavement of one's neighbour. As Albino Barrera puts it:

YHWH as landowner affords sanctuary and provides sustenance to all sojourners who have been welcomed to reside in God's domain. Naturally by extension, guest and tenants who have been welcomed and received to dwell on the land are expected to mutually respect each other and treat one another justly, if only because they are each equally under the landowner's charge as his guests and tenants.³⁸

Legislation concerning the lending of money frames it as a good thing to do as a response to someone in need.³⁹ But on no account should another's misfortune be turned into an opportunity for personal gain. In Nehemiah we are given a picture where the rich and powerful Israelites have become like Pharaoh and are exploiting a famine to make others debt slaves (Neh. 5:3–5). Nehemiah calls the “nobles and officials” to repentance and in particular to stop charging interest on what they are lending and make restitution (Neh. 5:10). The text is a depiction of what judgment, repentance and a return to faithfulness involves. In the New Testament, the story of Jesus' encounter with Zacchaeus, a tax collector and probable moneylender, directly echoes Nehemiah. The sign of Zacchaeus' repentance—that he really changed his ways—is that he pays back “four times” the money he extorted (Luke 19). Central to the faithful witness of the People of God, in both Old and New Testaments, is that they do not actively make each other debt slaves and exploit each other in pursuit of money.⁴⁰

Usury as a Political Act

To understand how usury introduces the friend-enemy distinction we must understand how usury is, in the first place, a political rather than a solely economic act. The concern about lending money and the proper treatment of those in debt can be read as simply pertaining to the proper ordering of economic relations. However, this is to decouple in a peculiarly modern way what we might call the status of the “citizen” from questions of political economy. To participate as a full member of the covenantal community or organized body politic required a land holding. Land provided the basis for the right and obligation to participate in the legal assemblies, to act in common ventures such as defence, and to be present representatively at the festivals. Barrera notes that:

Only landholding families can serve as building blocks of the covenant relationship. In the first place, to be landless is to be separated from the natural family community and to be merely guests on someone else's land; it is to be completely at the mercy of the host, that is, the landowner, for security and livelihood. . . . Second, . . . landholding is critical because it is only through the ownership and use of land that families are able to discharge their military, juridic, and cultic obligations. Third, the land is the family's tangible and direct link to being identified with and made a part of the Chosen People of God.⁴¹

Thus, land provided the basis of participation in both the assembly of tribes (the *edah*) and the local tribal assembly (the *shevet*) and the means to fulfil the obligations of the covenant with God and the duties of care owed to one's fellow Israelites.⁴² To be without land meant one was without the necessary power (i.e., the ability to act) in relations of mutual responsibility and there-

fore one was unable to fulfil one's covenant obligations. This in turn affected the holiness of the people as a whole because the quality of covenantal relations broke down since *tzedakah u'mishpat* (justice and righteousness), the term for the complex of obligations and rights that are the basis of the God-given social order, can no longer be fulfilled.⁴³ The ultimate punishment for failure to fulfil covenant obligations is exile from the land. Thus the land in general, and familial land holdings in particular, are central to the organisation and identity of Israel as a body politic. To make those subject to covenantal obligations debt slaves and permanently expropriate their land is to undermine not only the political order but also the holiness of the people.

An illustrative parallel can be drawn with ancient Athens where there was also a direct link between property and citizenship. Only property-owning men could be full citizens. In Athens there were strict regulations on how land could be bought and sold and if you were a citizen you could not be made a debt-slave. Indeed, as John Dunn notes: "Democracy in Athens arose out of struggles between wealthier landowners and poorer families who had lost, or were in danger of losing, their land, and who therefore risked being forced into unfree labour by their accumulated debts."⁴⁴ Concern about the interrelationship between debt and the proper ordering of political relations is reflected in Aristotle. Aristotle distinguishes between property in land, which was "natural", and commercial trading, which was insatiable. Aristotle perceived that there was, in principle, no limit to the desire for money. For Aristotle, the pursuit of money as an end in itself tended to instrumentalise and commodify all other relationships and arts, even philosophy itself.⁴⁵ As Andrew Meilke notes: "Aristotle must take a serious view of this, because such confusion would undermine the rational ordering of ends set out at the beginning of the *Ethics* which he thinks is essential for the proper working of the polis and the pursuit of the good life (EN., I, 1094a1-94b1 1)."⁴⁶ The pursuit of money as an end rather than as a means of exchange undermined the virtues of courage and justice necessary to pursue the truly good life and sustain the freedom of the city that is the condition of the pursuit of such a life. For Aristotle, pursuit of money as an end led to extremes of wealth, gluttony and cowardice. To quote Aristotle: "And the avarice of mankind is insatiable . . . men always want more and more without end; for it is of the nature of desire to be unlimited, and most men live only for the gratification of it."⁴⁷ Politics, among other things, was the public practice through which the common institutions of self-government preserved the sense of community necessary to subordinate the power of money to the pursuit of the common good. Aristotle's condemnation of usury, like that of the Bible, is born out of a concern for the maintenance and health of the body politic and is not a reductively economic concern.⁴⁸ Lending and borrowing were to be situated within relations of *koinonia* and reciprocal exchange that reflected the mutual obligations of citizenship and were not to be subordinated to the pursuit of money as an end in itself.⁴⁹ For Aristotle, usury led to the fracturing

of the proper relationship between citizens.⁵⁰ Aristotle condemns the usurer: like the pimp, he takes more than he ought, from the wrong sources and for reasons of sordid gain.⁵¹ He discusses the usurer under the category of “meanness” defined as deficiency in giving and excess in taking.

In ancient Israel, to be a lender and borrower are good things.⁵² However, as David Novak, following Maimonides, puts it, the aim of such relations is to create conditions in which the recipient will “not have to ask other human beings for aid” and thereby re-establish the covenantal equality of lender and borrower before God.⁵³ For Israel, to be a lender and a borrower is to be situated within economic relations of inter-dependence, cooperation and mutual responsibility that reflect the God-given pattern of covenantal relations. To lend and borrow is to be drawn into relationships that demand the negotiation of a common life in which the flourishing of the individual is dependent on the flourishing of others. Maintaining economic relations so they reflect the reality of inter-dependence and mutual responsibility requires limits to ensure that the vulnerabilities involved in being a lender or a borrower do not become occasions for exploitation, oppression and abuse. It is to this need that the legislation concerning usury is addressed and it is the order of fraternal inter-dependence and mutual responsibility that the act of usury opposes, making of the usurer an enemy of God and his people. Likewise whether in the Athenian polis, Israel or the Christian *ekklesia*, debt was a public issue as it related directly to the conditions of citizenship and the health of the commonwealth. Up to and including the Reformation, debates about usury understood the linkage between debt and the ability to sustain public friendship. Contrary to Mandeville and his modern inheritors, private vice *did* directly affect public virtue.⁵⁴ However, as it came to be articulated by Hobbes and then Locke, there is a shift away from a view of citizenship as a form of *koinoinia* towards a more contractual view based on property ownership.⁵⁵ Crucial here is the shift from natural rights to subjective rights, wherein, as O’Donovan notes, “subjective rights are taken to be original, not derived.”⁵⁶ Citizenship becomes located within a vision of what C. B. Macpherson calls “possessive individualism” in which freedom is a zero sum game and not about reciprocal relations in which the individual’s freedom and fulfilment is constituted by relations with others.⁵⁷ With the shift to a contractual basis for political order as a whole, limiting debt due to its corrosive effects on reciprocal relations of mutual responsibility wanes as a primary public concern. In the contemporary context personal debt has ceased to be a threat to good citizenship and political order. Instead, as Sheldon Wolin and others have argued, the citizen is now conceptualised as a consumer and the economy, not public or civic life, is demarcated as the sphere of free, uncoerced relations.⁵⁸ On Wolin’s account, liberalism identifies freedom with private interest rather than the pursuit of common action and shared advantage. The corollary of this is to grant the economy—the sphere of private interest and uncoerced relations—maximal scope and priority over

the requirements of good government or the goods of any institution, whether it is a family, a farm, or a factory. Economics becomes the queen of the sciences that can best tell us about how to order our common life.⁵⁹ As a result social harmony is no longer seen to issue from a prior set of institutional and political arrangements, but is understood to flow from the spontaneous equilibrium of economic forces. Within such a vision the status of the citizen becomes absorbed into that of the producer or consumer.⁶⁰ Within such a conception, debt is the condition of good citizenship as debt sustains the dominant economic order—capitalism—and its corollary, a debt-driven consumer culture in which social relations are mediated and represented through consumerist modes of common action and identity formation.

Usury as Non-violent Warfare

There is no absolute condemnation of usury in Scripture. While neither the misfortune of the poor and landless is to be exploited for personal gain, nor the lending of money or goods to one's kin to be treated as an occasion for profit, usury is licit when it comes to foreigners (Deut. 15:3, 23:20; Lev. 25:39–54). The distinction between the prohibition of usury in relation to those subject to the laws of Israel and its licitness when it comes to foreigners has long troubled Christian interpreters. A common way of reconciling the seeming contradiction is through some kind of contextualisation that thereby relativises the distinction. For example, Edward Neufeld suggests that because Israel was a peasant economy most loans were distress or consumption loans rather than loans for investment. By contrast, loans to foreigners were commercial loans relating to trade.⁶¹ However, this solely economic explanation is too reductive. Calvin, who is often associated with the economic contextualisation of the usury prohibitions in Scripture, is in fact closer to the mark when he states:

Looking at the political law, no wonder God permitted his people to exact fenory from foreigners: because otherwise mutual reciprocity would not have obtained, without which one side must needs be injured. God commands his people not to practise fenory, and therefore by this law lays the obligation on the Jews alone, not on foreign peoples. Therefore, in order that analogous conditions may prevail, he concedes the same liberty to his people that the Gentiles were arrogating to themselves, because precisely this moderation is tolerable, where the position of both parties is the same and equal.⁶²

Calvin brings to the fore the issue of power and how the equal and fraternal relations of mutuality that was to pertain to relations between the Israelites could not be expected between the Israelites and foreigners due to the asymmetry of power. Usury was a means of gaining power in relations with dominant foreign powers that potentially threatened the existence of Israel

while at the same time providing prosperity for Israel as a sign of God's favour. It is in this context that we can best make sense of Deuteronomy 15:6: "When the Lord your God has blessed you, as he promised you, you will lend to many nations, but you will not borrow; you will rule over many nations, but they will not rule over you." If the charging of interest to fellow Israelites positioned one as an enemy of God, then the charging of interest to foreigners was a correct identification of the foreigner as a possible adversary of God's good order. It is at this point that Schmitt's conception of the political clarifies what is at stake. Foreigners were enemies (latent or actual) with whom Israel was prepared to go to war. Foreigners were not necessarily evil or immoral; indeed, they may well conform to the Noahide covenant. Nevertheless, they were enemies who represented a real threat to the existence of Israel and its way of life. Conversely, if usury in the Old Testament is a political judgement on one's relations with another, one is not to treat one's own people as enemies but as neighbours.

Such an interpretive strategy could be judged anachronistic and idiosyncratic. However, it finds a direct echo in Patristic and Scholastic interpreters. Ambrose, amid a diatribe against those who exacted usury from a brother in faith and those under Roman law, conceptualises usury as a form of war that was nevertheless lawful in relation to an enemy, for "wherever there is the right of war, there is also the right of usury".⁶³ However, he immediately qualifies this by repeating the New Testament admonition that we are to love our enemies and lend to those from whom we can expect no return.⁶⁴ His formula: "*ubi ius belli, ibi etiam ius usurae*" received a mixed reception as a way of interpreting Deuteronomy 23 and the licitness of usury with enemies. Some followed his interpretation. For example, Benjamin Nelson notes that Rolandus Bandinelli (who later became Pope Alexander III in 1159) argued that usury could be exacted from heretics, infidels and those who attacked the church, for through the afflictions of usury the enemy could be brought to unity with the church.⁶⁵ However, while Ambrose's interpretation was used in Gratian's *Decretum* (1140), which in turn, as Jacques Le Goff points out, was the "die from which Canon Law was cast," most rejected Ambrose's approach.⁶⁶ Nelson postulates, with some hyperbole, that from the twelfth century onwards:

The threat to the professed universalism of Christianity embodied in the Ambrosian analysis could no longer go unanswered. The double standard for the Brother and the Other appeared mysterious, paradoxical, anachronistic, and vicious to Christians, who were fascinated by the vision (or vocabulary) of a morality rooted in the Brotherhood of Man under the Fatherhood of God.⁶⁷

Nelson overstates his case in order to warrant his wider thesis, but the basic point is right.⁶⁸ For example, Aquinas rejects Ambrose's interpretation and rationalises the double standard as equivalent to the law on divorce: "And the

fact that they took interest from foreigners show not that they were entitled to do so as of right but only that they were allowed to do so to avoid the greater evil of taking interest from their fellow Jews, God's own people, out of sheer greed."⁶⁹ I will defend the Ambrosian interpretation but argue it is in need of further specification so it allows for a synthesis with a broader Thomistic analysis of usury. The seemingly paradoxical double standard Ambrose's interpretation brings to the fore can only be made sense of in Christian terms within a Christological and eschatological framework. Such a framework was largely absent from but not necessarily antithetical to Scholastic treatments of usury, bound as they were to Aristotelian and natural law arguments.⁷⁰

A defence of the Ambrosian view requires returning to a theological exegesis of usury in Scripture. For such an exegesis it is important to relate the licitness of usury in relation to foreigners to responses to the conditions of exile. Whether or not Leviticus and Deuteronomy were written prior to, during or after the exilic period is a matter of much dispute. However, what is at issue here is not the dating of these texts but their subsequent reception in the analysis of usury and the context in which these texts were used. It was within the conditions of exile, whether in medieval Europe or elsewhere, that texts such as Lev. 25:39–54 and Deut. 23:19–20 functioned to structure relations between Jew and Gentile, for good and ill. Thus interpreting these texts within a theological reading of Scripture necessitates locating them within the broader teaching on how to respond to conditions of exile, and in relation to this, the key text for shaping the response to exile and negotiating *galut* / diaspora existence is Jeremiah 29.

In common with much Old Testament scholarship, Andrew Mein holds that the exiled Israelites Jeremiah addresses in Babylon were not slaves or prisoners and were allowed a degree of personal freedom and communal self-organisation. In addition, they were able to gather both to hear a letter and debate the issues that affected them as a community. However, at the same time, Mein points out that the exiles' very identity and existence as a people was under threat and the experience of domination and oppression a constant reality.⁷¹ Daniel Smith-Christopher goes further, noting that to say the Israelites were not "slaves" is too imprecise. While agreeing that a degree of self-organisation was possible, Smith-Christopher argues that the Israelites did suffer forced labour and the process of exile entailed severe trauma.⁷² For Smith-Christopher, the advice given in Jeremiah to "build, plant and marry" should not be read as an indication of the favourable conditions of life in Babylonia. Rather, he reads it as an echo of Deuteronomy 20 and its list of those who were exempted from fighting in war. Smith-Christopher argues these exemptions are to ensure that no one misses out on enjoying the good things of life bestowed on the covenant nation by the Lord. In his reading, Jeremiah is declaring that although the exiles are in a situation of war with their oppressors, the condition of the exiles themselves is not one of active

military service; in other words, despite their perilous circumstances, they are not to resort to violence to address their situation. Instead, Jeremiah's advice to the exiles represents an emergent Jewish ethic of "nonviolent social resistance" that Smith-Christopher sees evidence of in Daniel, later Pharisaic practice and early Christianity.⁷³

Smith-Christopher's reading builds on and seeks to affirm a move most clearly articulated by John Howard Yoder who envisages *galut* as the normative condition of God's people and exile as a return to the true vocation of the People of God.⁷⁴ For Yoder, Babylon becomes a stand-in for Jerusalem because it more faithfully represents what Jerusalem was meant to be. Jerusalem became the site for the Tabernacle and therefore the Temple because historically it had belonged to no tribe. It was foreign ground possessed by no one. Following the logic of the Tabernacle's former itinerant ministry, God could be present to the People in Jerusalem without being possessed or controlled by any particular tribe. On Yoder's reading, Babylon functions in the same way, both in Jeremiah and historically. As Yoder puts it: "The transcendence of the Most High is acted out in the fact that the place of his manifestation is not our own turf. God's choosing to pitch his tent in our midst is his mercy, not our merit or our property."⁷⁵ On Yoder's reading Jesus and the early church follow the Jeremian pattern of not orientating themselves to the world politically or militarily so as to re-gain control or be in charge, but missiologically, so as to bear faithful witness.⁷⁶ Such a missiological orientation implies neither withdrawal nor sub-cultural resistance but, as exemplified in the stories of Joseph, Daniel and Esther, it entails combining active investment in Babylon's well-being with faithful particularity and obedience to God.

An analysis of usury problematises Yoder's reading. The continued advocacy and practice of usurious relations with foreigners denotes the foreigner as an enemy. This conforms exactly to Smith-Christopher's exegesis of Jeremiah 29. For Smith-Christopher, while Jeremiah is advocating a "nonviolent social resistance," he states: "It is a militant non-violence that has very little in common with an appeasing liberal pacifism because it is an engaged, strategic position towards authority and power that is certainly aware of the requirements for success and survival."⁷⁷ I want to suggest that a central part of this non-violent strategy was the use of usury to gain power and ensure survival while negotiating an asymmetric relation with an oppressor, and in particular when lacking territorial sovereignty. In short, usury was non-violent warfare. As Ambrose puts it: "He fights without a weapon who demands usury; without a sword he revenges himself upon an enemy, who is an interest collector from his foe."⁷⁸ As a tactic, usury against foreigners/oppressors/enemies was a piece of "political jujitsu": that is, making creative use of the prevailing power relations in order to divert and adapt them to different ends by those in a subordinate position.⁷⁹

The Deuteronomic double standard suggests that unlike murder or lying, charging interest does not constitute an absolute moral prohibition or exception less moral norm. Although, as Calvin perceived:

Usury has almost always these two inseparable accompaniments, viz. tyrannical cruelty and the art of deception. Elsewhere, the Holy Spirit, in praising the saintly, God-fearing man who has abstained from usury, likewise shows that it is very unusual to see a worthy man who is at the same time a usurer.⁸⁰

However, in Scripture, charging interest in itself is morally ambiguous and does not fall under the strictures of the moral principle, as set out in Augustine's *Contra Mendacium*, that one should never do evil in order to achieve good. Like a drug (*pharmakon*), usury is both a poison and a remedy.⁸¹ Its ambiguity and double-edged nature, rendered explicit in the Deuteronomic double standard, is what makes the treatment of usury such a contested and confusing field of endeavour. It is also what makes usury the perfect means by which to seek simultaneously the welfare of Babylon while not losing sight of the fact that Babylonians are enemies and Babylon itself is a direct threat to the identity and existence of Israel. To offer credit at interest is to serve an essential need in the monetary economy. As the history of capitalism suggests, profiting from interest-based credit and the levels of exchange it facilitates is a potent driver in the creation of monetary wealth, technical innovation and the provision of welfare. The effect of usury is to draw people into relationship with each other who ordinarily might have nothing in common or who are deeply suspicious of each other and have no shared ends. Indeed, Hayek's concept of "catallaxy" is premised on the notion that exchange "'transforms the enemy into a friend.'"⁸² At a concrete level, one fruit of modern economic globalisation is just such an increase in trade between enemies. However, as well as enabling exchange, credit also gives enormous power to the creditor, in some cases it is a power to rival that of a king or an emperor, and its effects can be hugely destructive on social and political relations. The immiserating impact of debt repayments, whether on a personal level or among developing countries, are instances of this destruction. Myriad personal testimonies recount how the burden of debt leads to family breakdown, depression and in some cases suicide. It maybe non-violent, but usury is a most effective form of warfare for those without weapons.

Usury, Sovereignty and Neighbour Love

This brings us back to Schmitt's conception of the political and how it relates to his understanding of sovereignty. For Schmitt the condition of diaspora is defined as a condition in which sovereignty is lacking. For Schmitt, a diaspora people are utterly subject to the sovereignty of another. Sovereignty,

as defined by Schmitt, would seem to be contradicted by a conception of usury as a declaration of war. For Schmitt, only sovereign powers can declare war.⁸³ It is at this point that the analysis of usury in Scripture both affirms and reconfigures Schmitt's conception of the political. A central point of contention for Schmitt is denying the plausibility of pluralist and corporatist conceptions of sovereignty as articulated on the one hand in the work of G. D. H. Cole, Harold Laski and Neville Figgis and on the other by Otto Von Guericke.⁸⁴ Yet if usury is a means of asserting the friend-enemy distinction and of declaring and carrying on war, then by his own definitions Schmitt must allow for the possibility of more than one source of sovereignty coexisting within a single polity and not just the plurality that arises through the existence of many states. Identifying usury as a form of warfare is not a case of confusing economics with politics but of properly identifying usury as primarily a political act. The analysis of usury developed here contests Schmitt's claim that "only states, and not just any domestic and international association, are the bearers of politics."⁸⁵ As Schmitt himself contends:

It is . . . erroneous to believe that a political position founded on economic superiority is "essentially unwarlike," as Joseph Schumpeter says in his *Zur Soziologie der Imperialismen*. Essentially unwarlike is the terminology based on the essence of liberal ideology. An imperialism based on pure economic power will naturally attempt to sustain a worldwide condition which enables it to apply and manage, unmolested, its economic means, e.g., terminating credit, embargoing raw materials, destroying the currencies of others, and so on. Every attempt of a people to withdraw itself from the effects of such "peaceful" methods is considered by this imperialism as extra-economic power.⁸⁶

With self-conscious irony Schmitt rightly identifies as an ideological mask the liberal attempt to re-describe the economic power undergirding imperialism as purely peaceful and economic rather than political. However, what applies to the imperial power must by implication relate to a people or any corporatist entity utilizing the same means to exercise political power over others—whether this people or corporation exist within or without a state.⁸⁷

This brings us to the passage in Luke and the question of what to make of Schmitt's interpretation of the command to love thy enemies. It is striking that in some of the most explicit teaching about the love commandment in the New Testament we find teaching about the use of money and how we are to lend to each other. In the light of the theological reading of the treatment of usury in Scripture in relation to Schmitt's conception of the political, a somewhat different gloss to that by Schmitt may be given to Luke 6:33–36. Schmitt's interpretation is too individualistic and fails to reckon with how Jesus' teaching is directed not so much at individual believers but at the corporate identity and practice of Israel as a people.⁸⁸ Marcus Borg sets out how at the heart of the depiction of Jesus' ministry is a conflict between Jesus

and his contemporaries about the shape and purpose of the people of God, which is itself part of a wider debate about the response of Judaism to Roman political power and the encroachment of Hellenistic culture.⁸⁹ Jesus rejected, and presented an alternative to, every other post-exilic programme for Israel's internal reform and quest for holiness. For all of these were based on the exclusion of sinners/enemies, separation from the 'world' (that is, Gentile uncleanness and rule), and solidarity formed by defining Israel's identity through opposition to sinners and Gentiles. Instead, Jesus advocated participation in the kingdom of God as enacted in his table-fellowship.⁹⁰

In Luke 6 Jesus echoes Jeremiah 29 in the recognition that the other is indeed an enemy who represents a real threat. Rome can and does destroy Jerusalem. So the question is: how are the people of God to remain faithful and holy while at the same time recognise the reality of their relationship with their enemies? In this question the status of lending, and thence usury in relation to enemies, is central. After Christ, was usury a legitimate form of non-violent direct action? In the light of what has already been said, is Luke 6 a unilateral declaration of "ceasefire" by the messiah-king? It would seem that with Jesus' emphasis on open commensality rather than hostility with Israel's enemies (both internal and external) hospitality replaces usury as the way of negotiating relations with enemies. The exhortation to "love your neighbour" in Leviticus 19 and the patterns of behaviour that characterise such love are now to be extended even to enemies. Colossians and other epistles make the same point. If Jesus is the Christ, then for those who are in Christ political relations—that is, friend-enemy relations have ended. As Colossians 3:1–11 puts it:

So if you have been raised with Christ, seek the things that are above, where Christ is, seated at the right hand of God. . . . In that renewal there is no longer Greek and Jew, circumcised and uncircumcised, barbarian, Scythian, slave and free; but Christ is all and in all!⁹¹

Schmitt is right to point to the self-delusions of liberalism to represent an end to and overcoming of the political. However, he utterly failed to account for how the church as the body of Christ does represent the relativisation of the political and points to its ultimate overcoming. The church, as those who are gathered together and confess Christ as *kyrios*/Lord, demonstrate their allegiance to this King through worship, for worship is the performance of the ekklesia's ultimate allegiance.⁹² Such a community, one in which everyone was an enemy of God but is now reconciled to God and each other through the hospitality of Christ, cannot have a political allegiance based on the exclusion of enemies. Rather, it is a citizenship bound by fraternal relations through and in Christ, a fraternity or fellowship from which none may be excluded.⁹³

Those in Christ are not to treat enemies as enemies but as neighbours to be loved, thereby witnessing to Christ's sovereign rule. By implication, faithful-

ness requires extending the ban on usury to all humans, as a means of witnessing to the good news that all humans may now be brothers in Christ. Yet, before God's ultimate victory enemies remain. While fellowship is the goal, it cannot bypass judgment against and confrontation with the structures, institutions and people who oppose God's rule. Building real relationship must encompass judging your enemy as an enemy and identifying the nature of the conflict that stands between you before there can be any possibility of reconciliation and friendship. However, usury is no longer permissible; rather, we are to lend, "expecting nothing in return" because usury threatens to re-introduce the friend-enemy distinction as a permanent and political relation rather than temporary and missiological one. The key distinction here between "political" and "missiological" is that political relations denote relations with those whose form of life is seen as an existential threat to one's own, whereas missiological relations relativise all political relations as penultimate and as pertaining to one's temporal not ultimate identity. Thereby it makes a politics of the common good possible. For example, contra Marx, on a missiological account, the interests of the rich and poor are not inherently opposed: while enemies must be judged in terms of the injured right they cause, mutual interests and shared goods may still be jointly pursued together.

Where lending at interest does not threaten to re-introduce political relations but can maintain relations of reciprocal exchange, then it is licit. Crucial here is whether the exchange involves compulsion or not. And here, as Odd Langholm has detailed, the Scholastic debate over usury is directly relevant, focused as it was on the question of the relationship between need, free will and compulsion. Responding largely to Aristotle, the key image was that of a ship's captain who has to throw his cargo overboard in a storm in order to save his life and his ship. While an act of free will, it could hardly be said to be voluntary in any straightforward sense. At best such action was forced by need and involved a "mixed will." Likewise, the one who agrees to pay interest by dint of necessity or at a time of distress acts under duress.⁹⁴ In such cases, lending at interest was an act of coercion and unjust.⁹⁵

More difficult was the case of interest where there was no necessity, and thence no coercion involved in the exchange. A factor determining whether the relationship was usurious or not was whether ownership of the money had been transferred or whether, as in the case of a partnership (either in the form of a *societas* or a *foenus nauticum*), the creditor retained ownership of the money.⁹⁶ Profit was legitimate in these cases. In instances where the ownership of money was transferred variations on two arguments were used in adjudicating whether charging interest was unjust or not. The first argument centered on the issue of consumptibility. For certain things, for example a house, the use and ownership of the item were separable and so its use could be rented without the transfer of ownership. By contrast, with other items, for example, wine, use and ownership were inseparable. To use it was to

consume it and so wine could not be rented. As Aquinas puts it: "Somebody who wanted to sell wine and the use of the wine separately would be selling the same thing twice over or be selling something non-existent. And this would obviously be to commit the sin of injustice."⁹⁷ Money was seen to be like wine and not like a house and so could not be rented. The second argument was built around Aristotle's contention that money was sterile. Unlike a cow or a fruit tree, left on its own money could not grow or bear fruit. Likewise, give a bag of gold to someone and unlike a house or a pig, which is changed by time and use, they can give exactly the same thing back. Thus to seek interest or make a charge for the loan of money was to make money an end in itself rather than a means to an end and this was to make money act against its own nature, which was to be a medium of exchange. Conversely, where legitimate cost, risk or some other title could be claimed then a charge could be made. Legitimate charges related, broadly speaking, to questions of: i) *damnum emergens* (where a payment was delayed, a charge was incurred as a form of compensation, analogous to a modern credit card arrangement); ii) *indemnity* (where there was a danger of losing one's capital a charge could be made as a form of insurance against loss); iii) *lucrum cessans* (interest could be charged where greater profit could have been earned with the money using it for something else, so the interest was a form of restitution for lost earnings); and iv) *remuneration* or *stipendium laboris* (a charge could be made for the work in managing a loan). The question then becomes what constituted an excessive charge.

On the account developed here there was a proper debate to be had about non-coercive and commercial lending and the kinds of interest and charges that could be made on such loans. The key issue is whether the relationship involves partnership, equitable relations and shared risk. As Christopher Franks argues, it is important to be mindful of the very different assumptions about the relationship between the human and natural order informing the pre-modern debates and those that inform contemporary economics.⁹⁸ Nevertheless, after Christ, as part of the penultimate political economy of the *saeculum*, the charging of interest, where it is non-coercive and involves just relations and mutual benefit rather than selfish gain, is licit. When it becomes coercive and fundamentally alters the relationship between lender and borrower then it pertains to the public order of a polity and the question of who legitimately can exercise coercive force. At this point government legislation is required in order to protect the needy and weaker party in the exchange. The most consistent and long-standing example of this kind of protection, still existent in countries such as France, Germany, Poland and Italy, is a cap on interest rates.

After Christ, the prohibition against usury is universalized, as it constitutes a form of false witness as a way of organizing relations with enemies. Instead, modes of confrontation and re-balancing power relations are required so as to allow mutual responsibility to emerge. Forms of political engagement are

needed that open up a space for new ways of relating, ways that reconfigure the unjust status quo and establish instead relations in which all may flourish within an earthly peace. As with Christ's hospitality such forms of witness cannot be an act of assertion over against what exists nor can they set themselves up in competition with what exists. Rather, such witnesses must reformulate what exists so that all may benefit. It is not about the vindication of a particular interest but the establishment of a genuinely common good. The Christian conceptualisation of this is of course "martyrdom": the witnessing to an order in which all may flourish in communion with God and each other.⁹⁹

Usury as a mode of creative non-violent resistance does not allow for either a genuinely eschatological witness or the establishment of an earthly common good because it retains a political stance towards "foreigners"; that is, it retains the view of one for whom an enemy represents an ultimate or existential threat. After Christ, even when the threat is such that the church must adopt a *status confessionis*, no principality or power can set at risk or fundamentally threaten the Kingdom of God established by Christ's death and resurrection to which the church bears witness.¹⁰⁰ So while the enemy is a real and present danger, the threat they pose is only ever a penultimate one. Soteriologically defined, the enemy is always capable of repentance and redemption. In this respect Yoder was right: after Christ the primary relation to enemies is missiological not political. Contrary to Schmitt, for those in Christ the enemy is not "he who defines me," so that I am constituted through an intrinsically antagonistic and oppositional identity in relation to the enemy, one where my identity is born out of a negative mimesis of the other's enmity. Rather, the enemy becomes he who refuses the divinely ordained order of reciprocity and wants to subordinate this way of life to an earthly, unrighteous order.

A missiological orientation does not represent the overcoming of the friend-enemy distinction but its relativisation. Jacob Taubes's comparison of Schmitt and Karl Barth suggests how Barth's conception of the friend-enemy distinction helps unfold the theological basis of a missiological orientation to enemies.¹⁰¹ In his *Epistle to the Romans*, Barth defines the enemy as the revelation of evil, as one who is utterly opposed to God's order: "The enemy shows me the known man as finally and characteristically evil. He shows me, moreover, the evil freely running its course without let or hindrance, without obstacle or contradiction from within or from without."¹⁰² But as the one who is evil I discover in the enemy my own likeness. The enemy thus represents the crises of my own righteousness. The enemy is a messenger who reveals that I too am subject to the wrath of God. God is opposed to all ungodliness and unrighteousness, so that "if I purpose to be the enemy of my enemy" my human efforts to be good are just as subject to God's judgement as the evil of my enemy, for as sinful man I attempt to be good by doing evil.¹⁰³ For Barth: "Thou and the enemy smitten by God are one. Between thee and him there

is complete solidarity. His evil is thy evil; his suffering thy suffering; his justification thy justification. Thy redemption can only be that by which he is redeemed."¹⁰⁴ This solidarity in judgement and redemption between oneself and one's enemy relativises all conflicts. Any claim to absolute enmity, and the attempt to justify war against an enemy on these grounds, is an attempt to make oneself God by absolutizing a human judgement and thereby failing to reckon with the sinful and ungodly nature of oneself and one's intrinsic need of the other.¹⁰⁵ On Barth's theological conception of the friend-enemy distinction, Schmitt's conception is no longer tenable. However, Barth does not imply that conflicts cease. Rather, love, if it is directed to God's will inevitably entails opposition to and conflict with that which is conformed to this world rather than to the coming kingdom of God. If the above encapsulates the negative possibility of the friend-enemy relation, Wolf-Daniel Harwich *et al* draw out how Barth's conception of the friend-enemy distinction represents a positive possibility:

Enemy and love are for Barth complementary forms of experiencing God: in the enemy God reveals himself as the Other in the One, that is as the experience of God's distance in this world; in love God reveals himself as the One in the Other. While the enemy makes palpable the boundary between God and the world in his absence, love suspends this boundary and makes its presence known. The entirety of God's revelation is thus made possible in the paradoxical figure of the love of the enemy, which makes it possible to experience God's presence as well as his absence.¹⁰⁶

In sum, against rationalistically derived forms of universalism, Christians are not to presume enemies are really friends because all are the same or equal, but rather, through Christ, we may become enemies reconciled. But as enemies reconciled, the church witnesses against the Schmittian assumption that conflict is the basic and inevitable condition of the universal human society.

Conclusion

Discussion of usury is normally located within accounts of economic history or economic ethics. However, for Aristotle and the Bible the analysis of usury is primarily a political issue, defining as it does the nature of relations between friends and enemies. As indicated in the Scriptural treatment of usury, the morality of charging interest is properly open to development and does not constitute an exceptionless moral norm equivalent to the prohibition against murder or lying. The development of the term "usury"—from a catchall term denoting charging interest to a more specific term denoting the excessive or illegal charging of interest—is a proper and theologically consistent one. After the Christ-event, and the relativisation of the political, a more nuanced discussion of charging interest may emerge over time. This

discussion centres on the relative merits and limits of different kinds of interest that may or may not be charged. However, the charging of burdensome interest/usury is consistently condemned as an uncharitable, and then through the Scholastic debates, an unjust action. It is at the point that charging interest becomes uncharitable or unjust that as an economic relation it oversteps its boundary and becomes a political issue as it touches on the common or public life. At the point at which he oppresses another, undermining or removing from the other the power to communicate and act in a common world, the usurer has usurped legitimate political authority by falsely accruing coercive power. Indeed, the Scriptural and subsequent theological debate over usury brings to the fore the inter-relationship between political coercion and economic injustice: good political order requires economic justice and vice versa. Understood theologically, usury exposes the utopian fallacy of the self-regulating market by unveiling not only the need for political authority to intervene at certain points but also the primarily political nature of economic relations when they become coercive and particular interests become too dominant in shaping public order.

NOTES

- 1 Indicative of these directions is the work around the theological interpretation of Scripture (e.g., Kevin Vanhoozer, Stephen Fowl, A. K. M. Adam, and Francis Watson, *Reading Scripture with the Church: Toward a Hermeneutic for Theological Interpretation* (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2006)), scriptural reasoning (e.g., David Ford, *Christian Wisdom* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007)) and Oliver O'Donovan's work in political theology (e.g., Oliver O'Donovan, *The Desire of the Nations: Rediscovering the Roots of Political Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996)).
- 2 Carl Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, expanded edition, trans. George Schwab (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2007), p. 27.
- 3 *Ibid.*
- 4 In his later work Schmitt distinguishes between the "real enemy" and the "absolute enemy." The latter is one who is declared to be totally criminal and inhuman, "to be a total non-value." Carl Schmitt, *Theory of the Partisan: Intermediate Commentary on the Concept of the Political*, trans., G. L. Ulman (New York NY: Telos Press Publishing, 2007), p. 94. The notion of the absolute enemy is identified as a distinctly modern phenomenon that arises with the advent of absolute or total war conducted by both revolutionary regular and irregular forces.
- 5 Schmitt recognises that given the centrality and force of the political distinction other distinctions become emotionally aligned with it.
- 6 Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, p. 28.
- 7 *Ibid.*, pp. 69–73.
- 8 *Ibid.*, p. 31.
- 9 Schmitt, *Theory of the Partisan*, p. 85, footnote 89.
- 10 Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, p. 35.
- 11 *Ibid.*, p. 29. For Schmitt liberal Christianity has falsely interpreted the command to love your enemies as pertaining to conflicts between nations or groups via a false universal morality. This moralisation of the political with its attendant proposals to outlaw war did not overcome the friend-enemy distinction but simply opened new possibilities for such a distinction, and thence the possibility of war, to emerge. *Ibid.*, p. 51. Wars justified on grounds of humanitarian intervention can be seen as examples of just such a kind of war. Schmitt's interpretation of Luke 6 is not without precedent. As Benjamin Nelson notes, Melancthon in his commentary on Cicero's *De Officiis* gives a parallel interpretation. See

- Benjamin Nelson, *The Idea of Usury: From Tribal Brotherhood to Universal Otherhood* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1949), pp. 56–57. Richard Horsley gives a contemporary, parallel version of Schmitt's exegesis. Based on a close reading of the Sermon of the Mount, Horsley suggests that the emphasis is on loving personal enemies not foreign or political enemies. See Richard A. Horsley, *Jesus and the Spiral of Violence: Popular Jewish Resistance in Roman Palestine* (San Francisco, CA: Harper & Row, 1987), pp. 261–267.
- 12 Francis Watson, *Text, Church and World: Biblical Interpretation in Theological Perspective* (Edinburgh: T & T Clark), pp. 68–70. As Watson points out, what was an emergency measure, a state of exception, becomes a permanent ordinance that indentures the people while wrapping itself in the cloak of humanitarian concern.
 - 13 It is worth noting that, as Odd Langholm points out, the question of what constitutes compulsion and the issue of whether a voluntary act was really done under duress is central to the definitions of and debate around usury. Odd Langholm, *The Legacy of Scholasticism in Economic Thought: Antecedents of Choice and Power* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
 - 14 Gen. 47:18–19.
 - 15 Gregory Chirichigno, *Debt-Slavery in Israel and Ancient Near East* (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1993); Isaac Mendelsohn, *Slavery in the Ancient Near East: A Comparative Study of Slavery in Babylonia, Assyria, Syria and Palestine from the Middle of the Third Millennium to the End of the First Millennium* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1949).
 - 16 David Baker, *Tight Fists or Open Hands? Wealth and Poverty in Old Testament Law* (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2009), p. 140.
 - 17 For an extended reading of this text as a declaration of Jubilee see John Howard Yoder, *The Politics of Jesus*, second edition, (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1994), pp. 60–75. Yoder includes the Lord's Prayer as a call for the proper practice of Jubilee with its use of the word *aphiemi* in the statement: "remit us our debts as we ourselves have also remitted them to our debtors." *Ibid.*, p. 62.
 - 18 This is developed in a number of theologies of atonement. For example, Ambrose's *De Tobia* constitutes a complex allegory of sin and salvation that uses freedom from debt-slavery and the practice of usury as its central motif.
 - 19 David Mealand, *Poverty and Expectation in the Gospels* (London: SPCK, 1980), pp. 46–53.
 - 20 There is much debate on the relationship between the texts specifically addressed to the issue of usury, in particular Exodus 22:25, Leviticus 25:35–38 and Deuteronomy 15. There is a strong evidence of redactional unity between these texts and that the differences between them represent an unfolding line of development rather than one of disjunction. On this see Adrian Schenker, "The Biblical Legislation on the Release of Slaves: The Road from Exodus to Leviticus," *Journal for the Study of the Old Testament*, Vol.78 (1998), pp. 23–41.
 - 21 Not charging interest is a way of demarcating Israel from the other nations. As Von Rad notes, charging interest was common in the surrounding countries at the time. Gerhard Von Rad, *Deuteronomy* (London: SCM, 1966), p. 148.
 - 22 Samuel Loewenstamm "neshek and ma/tarbit," *Journal of Biblical Literature*, Vol. 88 no. 1 (1969), pp. 78–80; Baker, *Tight Fists or Open Hands?*, p. 260. There is some dispute over what kind of interest *neshek* represented and how it differed from *tarbit*. On this see Jacob Milgrom, *Leviticus 23–27* (New York, NY: Doubleday, 2000), pp. 2209–2210.
 - 23 For an extended discussion of Patristic teachings on usury see Robert Malony, "The Teaching of the Fathers on Usury: an Historical Study on the Development of Christian Thinking," *Vigiliae Christianae*, Vol. 27 (1973), pp. 241–265.
 - 24 Jacob Neusner, "Aristotle's Economics and the Mishnah's Economics: The Matter of Wealth and Usury," *Journal for the Study of Judaism in the Persian, Hellenistic and Roman Period*, Vol. 21 no.1 (1990), pp. 41–59.
 - 25 Also referred to as fenory (from the Latin, *foenus*) and ocker (from the German *wocker*).
 - 26 For developments in the theological analysis of usury and its development in Scholastic and Reformation thought see John T. Noonan, *The Scholastic Analysis of Usury* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957); Langholm, *The Legacy of Scholasticism in Economic Thought*; Diane Wood, *Medieval Economic Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 159–205; Jacques Le Goff, *Your Money or Your Life: Economy and Religion in the Middle Ages*, trans. Patricia Ranum (New York, NY: Zone Books, 1990); Eric Kerridge,

- Usury, Interest and the Reformation* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002); and Joan Lockwood O'Donovan, "The Theological Economics of Medieval Usury," *Studies in Christian Ethics*, Vol. 14 no. 1 (2001), pp. 48–64. Against those who argue for a radical disjuncture between the Reformers and the Scholastic view of usury, such as R. H. Tawney and Max Weber, Kerridge and O'Donovan are right in arguing for a consistency between the two. For a summary of the changes in Rabbinic teaching on charging interest see David Novak, "Economics and Justice: A Jewish Example," *Jewish Social Ethics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 223–224.
- 27 Noonan, *The Scholastic Analysis of Usury*, p. 407.
 - 28 Malony, "The Teaching of the Fathers on Usury," pp. 256–257.
 - 29 Noonan, *The Scholastic Analysis of Usury*, p. 15.
 - 30 Wood, *Medieval Economic Thought*, p. 163.
 - 31 This is seen most explicitly in the shift away from a strict view of usury in the later Scholastics such as Cajetan where the social usefulness of exchange banking forms the basis of Cajetan's arguments in its favour. Noonan, *The Scholastic Analysis of Usury*, p. 313.
 - 32 *Ibid.*, p. 401.
 - 33 Although as Jacob Milgrom notes, sexual and other violations of the law also connect to the proper treatment of the land. For Milgrom, sabbath rest is part of the expiation that purifies the land from sin. Jacob Milgrom, *Leviticus 17–22* (New York, NY: Doubleday, 2000), p. 1404.
 - 34 *Ibid.*, p. 1404; and Albino Barrera, *God and the Evil of Scarcity: Moral Foundations of Economic Agency* (South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005), p. 54.
 - 35 Chirichigno, *Debt-Slavery in Israel and Ancient Near East*, p. 142.
 - 36 Milgrom, *Leviticus 23–27*, pp. 2204–2228.
 - 37 Walter Houston, "What's Just About the Jubilee? Ideological and Ethical Reflections on Leviticus 25," *Studies in Christian Ethics*, Vol. 14 no. 1 (2001), pp. 34–47. On the debate surrounding the interpretation and dating of the Jubilee legislation see Baker, *Tight Fists or Open Hands?*, pp. 166–173.
 - 38 Barrera, *God and the Evil of Scarcity*, p. 67.
 - 39 Lev. 25:35–38; Deut. 15:1–11. On the provisions for mandatory lending see Barrera, *God and the Evil of Scarcity*, pp. 97–99.
 - 40 It is often asserted that the New Testament contains no judgement as to the morality of usury. For example, Robert Maloney contends: "The New Testament . . . makes no explicit judgment on the morality of usury." (Maloney, "The Teaching of the Fathers on Usury," p. 241). However, such a claim is rendered implausible if the New Testament teachings on the proper use of money are located within a broader understanding of the significance of debt and debt slavery in salvation history. Such an understanding makes explicit the continuity between Old and New Testaments concerning the judgement against usury. This kind of assertion also fails to reckon with the contextual background to the parables and teaching that explicitly mention usury. For example, Joseph Fitzmyer draws out how the prohibition against usury forms the key dramatic background to the parable of the dishonest manager in Luke 16:1–13 and is consistent with Old Testament teachings. Joseph Fitzmyer, *Essays on the Semitic Background of the New Testament* (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1997), pp. 161–180.
 - 41 Barrera, *God and the Evil of Scarcity*, p. 46. See also Novak, "Economics and Justice: A Jewish Example," p. 210.
 - 42 Daniel Elazar, *Covenant and Polity in Biblical Israel* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1995), pp. 86–91. Elazar helpfully summarises the overall structure of the polity within which the *edah* and *shevet* function.
 - 43 *Ibid.*, p. 133.
 - 44 John Dunn, *Setting the People Free: The Story of Democracy* (London: Atlantic Books, 2005), p. 32.
 - 45 Scott Meikle, "Aristotle on Money," *Phronesis*, Vol. 39 no. 1 (1994), pp. 26–44 (p. 30).
 - 46 *Ibid.*, pp. 30–31.
 - 47 Aristotle, *The Politics*, ed., Stephen Everson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 45 (1267b.1).
 - 48 Whether or not Aristotle had what in modern terms would be called a distinctively economic analysis, and more specifically an analysis of a monetary economy, is a matter of

- some dispute. On this see Scott Meikle, "Aristotle and the Political Economy of the Polis," *The Journal of Hellenic Studies*, Vol. 99 (1979), pp. 57–73.
- 49 Paul Millett, *Lending and Borrowing in Ancient Athens* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 151–158.
- 50 Usury in ancient Athens was mostly limited to small-time moneylenders who amounted to little more than local hustlers. *Ibid.*, pp. 180–188. However, much larger scale interest-bearing loans were lent for purposes of maritime trade. Such loans entailed huge sums. *Ibid.*, p. 195.
- 51 Aristotle, *The Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. David Ross (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 84 (1121b.34).
- 52 Arguably, in ancient Athens, given the status of the magnanimous man and the ideal of self-sufficiency, to be a lender was a good thing, and operated more on the principle of donation than reciprocity. But to be a borrower was to be located in a dependent rather than a mutual relation. Alasdair MacIntyre directly criticizes Aristotle's "illusion" of self-sufficiency, contrasting it with a Thomistic account of how dependency is a condition of the virtuous life. Alasdair MacIntyre, *Dependent Rational Animals* (London: Duckworth, 1999), p. 127.
- 53 Novak, "Economics and Justice: A Jewish Example," p. 210.
- 54 The sumptuary laws in Calvin's Geneva constituted an example of exactly this linkage. For an account of the shift, from Hobbes, Mandeville and Locke onwards, from a view of economic relations as reciprocal and as relations in which virtue was central to the proper ordering of commercial exchange to a conception of economic relations as driven by selfish interests divorced from the pursuit of the common good, see Luigino Bruno and Stefano Zamagni, *Civil Economy: Efficiency, Equity, Public Happiness* (Bern: Peter Lang, 2007).
- 55 It must be recognised that within a Christian account, especially from Augustine on, the basis and prospect of public or civic friendship changes from classical conceptions. The earthly polis is no longer the context of human fulfilment; nevertheless, citizenship is still a form of fellowship, albeit a distorted one based on a false ordering of love. On this see Eric Gregory, *Politics and the Order of Love: An Augustinian Ethic of Democratic Citizenship* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2008) and John von Heyking, "The Luminous Path of Friendship: Augustine's Account of Friendship and Political Order," *Friendship and Politics: Essays in Political Thought*, edited by John von Heyking and Richard Avramenko (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2008), pp. 115–138.
- While there are antecedents to Hobbes, the clearest initial articulation of a contractualist view of citizenship is given by him. For accounts of the development of a view of political relations as based on contract and property rights see Langholm, *The Legacy of Scholasticism in Economic Thought*, pp. 139–157; Joan Lockwood O'Donovan, "Historical Prolegomena to a Theological Review of 'Human Rights'." *Studies in Christian Ethics*, Vol. 9 no. 2 (1996), pp. 52–65; and Jean Bethke Elstain, *Sovereignty: God, State and Self* (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2008).
- 56 Oliver O'Donovan, *The Desire of the Nations: Rediscovering the Roots of Political Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 248; and pp. 278–281. See also Brian Tierney, *The Idea of Natural Rights: Studies on Natural Rights, Natural Law, and Church Law, 1150–1625* (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1997). Against Michel Villey's contention that subjective rights originate with Ockham, Tierney suggests that the conceptualisation of individual subjective rights has its origins among twelfth-century canon lawyers.
- 57 C. B. Macpherson, *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962).
- 58 Sheldon Wolin, *Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought*, expanded edition, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004), p. 261. Wolin's arguments have a direct parallel in Schmitt's critique of liberalism and what Schmitt identifies as the fallacious attempt by liberalism to overcome the political by the economic. On Schmitt's account the political always, of necessity, re-asserts itself. Like Wolin, Schmitt identifies the reduction of politics to categories of consumption and production (Carl Schmitt, *Roman Catholicism and Political Form*, trans., G. L. Ulman (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996), pp. 14–17) and the synchronicity between liberalism, capitalism and communism. Schmitt states: "I reiterate that the materiality of economic-thinking capitalists is very close to that of radical communism. Neither persons nor things require a

- "government" if the economic-technical mechanism is allowed its own immanent regularity." *Ibid.*, pp. 36–37. Schmitt contrasts the "juridical foundation of the Catholic Church on the public sphere" with "liberalism's foundation on the private sphere." *Ibid.*, p. 29.
- 59 Wolin, *Politics and Vision*, p. 271.
- 60 *Ibid.*, p. 273.
- 61 Edward Neufeld, "The Prohibitions Against Loans at Interest in Ancient Hebrew Laws," *Hebrew Union College Annual*, Vol.26 (1955), pp. 355–412.
- 62 John Calvin, *Commentarii in Libros Mosis necum in Librum Josue* (Amsterdam, 1567), p. 527. Quoted from and translation by Kerridge, *Usury, Interest and the Reformation*, appendix 1.
- 63 Ambrose, *De Tobia: A Commentary, with an Introduction and Translation*, trans. Lois Miles Zucker (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1933), p. 67 (15, 51).
- 64 *Ibid.*, pp. 70–71.
- 65 Nelson, *The Idea of Usury*, p. 15. Nelson notes that others who followed the Ambrosian interpretation included: Barnard of Pavia (d. 1213); Huguccio (fl. 1188); and Johannes Teutonicus (fl. 1216).
- 66 Le Goff, *Your Money or Your Life*, p. 22.
- 67 Nelson, *The Idea of Usury*, p. 8. Nelson notes that now and again canonists and interpreters broke rank. He cites the example of Henricus Bohic (d. ca 1350) who authorized Christians to demand usury from enemies of the Church and the Roman Empire. *Ibid.*, p. 18. However, for the most part, the Ambrosian exegesis was rejected and attacked, even by those who, from the fifteenth century on, sought to defend the creation of banks and the charging of interest (e.g. the Fifth Lateran Council in 1515). *Ibid.*, pp. 19–20.
- 68 For a critique of Nelson's thesis as a whole see Noonan, *The Scholastic Analysis of Usury*, pp. 400–401.
- 69 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae: Volume 38, Injustice: 2a.2ae. 63–79*, ed., Marcus Lefebvre (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 237 (78.1 ad 2m).
- 70 The centrality of natural law rather than a Scriptural basis to Scholastic arguments against usury is drawn out in Noonan's history of the Scholastic analysis. Noonan points out that it was the questioning of the natural law arguments, most importantly in the work of figures such as Domingo de Soto and Conrad Summenhart, that fatally weakened the Scholastic prohibition against usury. Noonan, *The Scholastic Analysis of Usury*, pp. 344–346.
- 71 Andrew Mein, *Ezekiel and the Ethics of Exile* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 66–71.
- 72 Daniel Smith-Christopher, *A Biblical Theology of Exile* (Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg Fortress, 2002), pp. 65–73.
- 73 Daniel Smith, "Jeremiah as Prophet of Nonviolence," *Journal for the Study of the Old Testament*, Vol. 43 (February, 1989), pp. 95–107; p. 104.
- 74 John Howard Yoder, *The Jewish-Christian Schism Revisited*, edited by Michael Cartwright and Peter Ochs, (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2003), pp. 161–162.
- 75 *Ibid.*, p. 161.
- 76 *Ibid.*, pp. 170–171; 190–192.
- 77 Daniel Smith, "Jeremiah as Prophet of Nonviolence," p. 104.
- 78 Ambrose, *De Tobia*, p. 67 (15, 51).
- 79 On this see Michel de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, trans. Steven Rendall (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1988), pp. 29–39.
- 80 From Calvin's 1575 letter to Claude de Sachin. Quoted from translation by André Biéler, *Calvin's Economic and Social Thought*, trans., James Greig (Geneva: WCC Publications, 2005), p. 404. In his commentary on Psalm 15 Calvin repeats this observation and goes on to compare the usurer to a bloodsucker and murderer. *Ibid.*, p. 413.
- In arguing that usury is not an exception-less moral norm my position is closer to that of Calvin than the Scholastics. However, as Biéler and Kerridge point out, Calvin was in practice, if not in principle, very close to the Scholastics. Kerridge argues that under the Reformers there were no substantial changes to Christian attitudes to usury, remedies for it, or laws against it. Kerridge, *Usury, Interest and the Reformation*, p. 23. Specifically in relation to Calvin, Biéler suggests that charging interest became lawful in principle while being forbidden whenever it contradicted the rule of justice and charity, whereas for the

- Scholastics charging interest was forbidden in principle, but allowed in many specific instances. Biéler, *Calvin's Economic and Social Thought*, p. 445.
- 81 Derrida points to the ambiguity in the word *pharmakon* in his study of Plato's *Phaedrus*. He notes how the term *pharmakon*—meaning a drug—can signify both a remedy and/or a poison. A *pharmakon* can be—alternately or simultaneously—beneficent and maleficent. Jacques Derrida, *Dissemination*, trans. Barbara Johnson (London: Athlone Press, 1981), p. 70.
 - 82 Friedrich von Hayek, *Law Legislation and Liberty, Vol 2: The Mirage of Social Justice* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1978), p. 108. The friend-enemy distinction plays an important role in Hayek's account and he explicitly cites Schmitt. *Ibid.*, p. 144, footnote 11. For Hayek, the market represents the means of overcoming the political as defined by the friend-enemy distinction.
 - 83 Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, pp. 46–47.
 - 84 *Ibid.*, pp. 40–45.
 - 85 *Ibid.*, p. 6. Schmitt himself seems to step back from this assertion in his later work, conceding that it is "degree of intensity of an association and dissociation" that constitutes the basis of making the friend-enemy distinction rather than whether such an association constitutes a state or not. Carl Schmitt, *Political Theology II: The Myth of the Closure of Any Political Theology*, trans., Michael Hoelzl and Graham Ward (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008), p. 45.
 - 86 Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, p. 78.
 - 87 Schmitt himself notes the evolution of the economically based power of workers and capitalists into political power through their assuming political representation. Schmitt, *Roman Catholicism and Political Form*, p. 24.
 - 88 This point is underscored in Schmitt's critique of Erik Peterson's attack on the notion of political theology. Despite great theological scholarship the overriding impression in Schmitt's discussion of Patristic disputes and the development of the early church is that the church is little more than a collection of factions and significant individuals. There is little sense of its corporate identity and institutional form. For Schmitt, "theological politics" denotes prelates being "politically active in the interest of the church without having to become theological in a dogmatic way" and not what William Cavanaugh calls a "church practice of the political" wherein the form of action is theologically and ecclesialogically determined. Schmitt, *Political Theology II*, p. 89.
 - 89 Marcus Borg, *Conflict, Holiness and Politics in the Teachings of Jesus, Studies in the Bible and Early Christianity* (Lampeter: Edwin Mellen Press, 1972), pp. 2–4.
 - 90 One thing all biblical scholars can agree on is that open commensality is a central feature of Jesus' ministry. For a more extensive account of this see Luke Bretherton, *Holiness and Hospitality* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006).
 - 91 See also Romans 10:12 and Galatians 3.
 - 92 O'Donovan, *The Desire of the Nations*, p. 47.
 - 93 Ephesians 2:11–22 can be read as a meditation on this theme.
 - 94 Langholm, *The Legacy of Scholasticism in Economic Thought*, pp. 62–76. As Langholm notes, the issue of compulsion was not restricted to the debate over usury but was central to discussions of the just price and the justice of market exchanges. *Ibid.*, pp. 77–99.
 - 95 This of course begs the question as to whether the acceptance of a consumption loan can ever not be based on some form of coercion.
 - 96 Aquinas's arguments render any such distinction problematic even though Aquinas himself allows for partnership and risk sharing arrangements. Noonan, *The Scholastic Analysis of Usury*, pp. 43–54; pp. 143–145. See also, Christopher Franks, *He Became Poor: The Poverty of Christ and Aquinas's Economic Teaching* (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2009), pp. 70–83.
 - 97 Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae 2a.2ae.* 63–79, p. 235 (78.1).
 - 98 Franks, *He Became Poor*, pp. 35–66.
 - 99 O'Donovan, *The Desire of the Nations*, p. 215.
 - 100 An example of just such a threat were the Nazis who constituted a threat to the "theological existence" of the church. Yet, as Karl Barth argued, even though it became bestial and constituted a threat to the theological existence of the church, no state should be judged wholly demonic or utterly evil and beyond redemption. Discriminate judgement was still needed to determine where and when it is being bestial and where and when it is not.

- 101 Jacob Taubes, *The Political Theology of Paul*, trans., Dana Hollander (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004).
- 102 Karl Barth, *Epistle to the Romans*, trans. Edwyn Hoskyns (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1933), p. 472.
- 103 *Ibid.*, p. 473.
- 104 *Ibid.*, p. 475.
- 105 *Ibid.*, p. 470. It is interesting to note how Barth's critique of one's attempt to vaunt oneself against one's enemy is directly echoed in his critique of revolution and conservatism (as well as militarism). For Barth, "all *principality and power and dominium* are AS SUCH subjected to the destructive judgement of God." *Ibid.*, p. 483. The implication of Barth's assertion of how political rulers are subject to the judgement of God is to question Schmitt's conception of sovereignty. It is God who decides the exception not any earthly sovereign whose power is merely ordained or derived from God and neither self-constituting nor absolute.
- 106 Wolf-Daniel Harwich, Aleida Assman and Jan Assman, "Afterword," in Jacob Taubes, *The Political Theology of Paul*, p. 130.